“In the happiness of his subjects lies the king’s happiness; in their welfare his welfare. He shall not consider as good only that which pleases him but treat as beneficial to him whatever pleases his subjects…An archer letting off an arrow may or may not kill a single man, but a wise man using his intellect can kill even reaching unto the very womb.” The Arthashastra
1. Kautilya, also known as Chanakya or Vishnugupta was the key advisor to – and the genius behind the strategy undertaken by the king Chandra Gupta Maurya (317-293 B.C.) who stopped the advance of Alexander the Great’s successors and introduced the Golden Age of India. The Mauryan kingdom united and amalgamated the Indian sub-continent into a single entity for the first time, thus creating the concept of Indian nationhood. The Mauryan Empire extended from the Persian border in the West to Burma in the East covered most of peninsular India. The empire lasted 150 years until about 180 BC, after which the empire dissociated into several fragments. Kautilya was the chancellor to Chandra Gupta Maurya, and he composed the Arthashastra to counsel a ruler on how to defeat one’s enemies and rule for the general good. The Arthashastra was very influential in ancient India up to the 12th century AD, when it faded from the public eye. The text, however, reappeared in 1904 and was published in English in 1915. 2. Artha of Arthashastra stands for wealth, but it has a much wider significance. As enunciated by Kautilya, wealth of a nation is both the territory of the state and the inhabitants of the state. Thus economics is at the heart of Arthashastra. A healthy economy and loyal subjects can be achieved by having an adequate balance between the treasury of the state and the welfare of the people, was preached by Kautilya. This was to be achieved by maintaining law and order and adequate administrative machinery. Thus the Arthashastra also contains the enforcement of laws (Dandaniti) and the details of the organisation of civil service and duties of state officials.
3. Written about 300 B.C., Kautilya’s work was pitched to teach with the various intricacies of governance and politics to the king. Kautilya has covered the subject in depth and offers insights into various spheres of statecraft, war and diplomacy. Kautilya wished his king to become a world conqueror hence his analysis of the types of war, his doctrine of assassination, sowing discord amongst the enemy, use of spies, religion, superstition, along with the use of women to create conflicts in the enemy camp are engrossing and unputdownable. 4. Books of Treatise. The Arthashastra is divided into 15 books, 150 chapters, 180 sections and 6,000 slokas. The books are arranged in a manner that the initial books deal with internal administration and the later books on a state’s relations with its neighbours. Interestingly, there exists a very prominent mention of the ancient Navy as he has mentioned the ‘superintendent of ships’ in Book II. He may have foreseen the advantages of a sea borne force and a Navy. 5. Science of Arthashastra. Kautilya believed that a ruler’s duties included the internal administration of the country, protection of the state from external aggression, maintenance of law and order within the state, and the welfare of the people. New territory had to be acquired by alliance or conquest for the prosperity of the state and also in the political environment existing then, which had many kings, anyone content with his own territory was likely to fall prey to hedgemonistic ambitions of the other. 6. Spectrum of Arthashastra. Kautilya argued that a nation could never achieve prosperity under a foreign ruler; indicating that independence was a pre-requisite for prosperity and economic progress. At the macro level, the Arthashastra covers the entire gamut of human society, the establishment and continuance of a nation state, foreign policy, war, civil law and economics. At the other end of the spectrum, the book delves into the building blocks of a society by clearly defining standardised weights, measures and time, values and taxes on commodities, metallurgical standards, sources of state revenue and a detailed analysis of the composition of an army and forts. 7. National Security. Kautilya insisted that all threats to national security must be eliminated at any cost to the state, while no enemy must be privy to the inner machinations and processes of one’s own state – “Like a tortoise, the king (state) shall draw in any limb of his that is exposed.” Internal stability was the harbinger of economic well being. However, to maintain internal and external security, Kautilya proposed a massive network of spies and agents operating within the state and also in surrounding and enemy states. Detailed descriptions of espionage and counter-espionage activities, physical punishments and torture for internal security set this work apart from any other political treatise. 8. The Arthashastra is thus a mixture of both what we applaud today and what we consider to be reprehensible. Kautilya wrote his book about 2300 years ago when extreme forms of governance were commonplace and the primary task of the ruling monarch was primacy of his state and a policy of expansionism. While Kautilya was quite willing to reward those who served the state, he seemed to have an obsession with using the discipline of the laws to make everything in the kingdom ‘just right’. In the Arthashastra, everyday life in all its multifarious activities comes in for careful regulation and adjustment, from the ‘cooking pot to the crown’.
9. The aim of this paper is to study the teachings of Arthashastra in order to determine its relevance and yield insights into military strategy and warfare with emphasis on counter insurgency and counter terrorism.
10. The concepts of defence and war as enunciated by Kautilya are as relevant in the 21st century as it was in the 3rd century BC.
11. The Arthashastra is essentially a treatise on the art of government and specially focuses on aspects of internal administration and foreign policy. It has been translated as “Science of Politics”, “Treatise on Polity” or the “Science of Political Economy”. However, the best description of the word comes from Heinrich Zimmer who translates the word as “Timeless Laws of Politics, Economy, Diplomacy and War”. 12. Two thousand three hundred years ago, Kautilya compiled the Arthashastra and with it he proved to be a kingmaker as he enabled the inception of the Maurya dynasty. The Arthashastra has endured the test of time and it has since withstood the test of credibility. We will be enriching ourselves if we learn and grasp even a fraction of the wisdom that Kautilya embodied. 13. Our ancient scriptures have been neglected and Western principles and teachings propounded in our literature, including military literature due to ignorance of students and insufficient importance by teachers. 14. Kautilya’s treatise enraptures in many ways, the complexity of our current world. The problems that existed then, persist in a more widespread and magnified manner in the contemporary world. The principles of Military strategy followed by Kautilya are also relevant in the contemporary world. 15. Study of his military strategy will throw some light on the in-depth knowledge of warfare in ancient India and will provide important lessons for conventional and unconventional warfare in the modern world, besides enhancing understanding and pride in our country and its thinkers. The lecture by Dr Gopalji Malviya, sparked the inquisitiveness and determination to study the Arthashastra.
16. The scope of this paper is restricted to the study and analysis of the aspects related to warfare as enunciated by Kautilya. The study does not include his precepts on the social, political and economical structure of an ideal state. Though Kautilya has treated foreign policy as an important part of warfare, only brief mention where necessary would be made. The famous Mandala theory has hence been consciously left out. Also the actual battle fighting and formations described in detail have been omitted to maintain focus on strategy. The study will cover the relevance of Arthashastra and its importance for modern warfare, counter insurgency and counter terrorism. 17. Though a sincere effort has been made to cover the relevance, trying to expound on Kautilya’s immense wisdom presents a remarkable challenge. Therefore, throughout this dissertation the work of Kautilya is quoted to speak for itself.
18. There are a number of books written on Arthashastra. Though some books are in Sanskrit and some are literal translations, some books are available in college library on the Arthashastra notably by LN Rangarajan, R Shamashastry, MV Krishna Rao and Roger Boeshe. Some data is also available on the internet and journals. A bibliography of sources is appended at the end of the paper. Likely sources include the following:- (a) Books written by eminent authors as mentioned above. (b) Papers submitted by researchers. (c) Information available over the internet. (d) Discussions with teachers and professors of history. Dr Gopalji Malviya was gracious enough to grant some valuable time for a ‘one on one’ discussion. His encouragement, advice and passion for the subject made the research meaningful.
19. The dissertation is organised into six chapters. Chapters one and two deal with introducing the subject and the methodology of the research. It is proposed to study the subject under the following heads:- (a) Chapter III – Principles of military strategy in Arthashastra. (b) Chapter IV – Relevance in 21st century conventional warfare. (c) Chapter V – Relevance in fourth generation warfare. (d) Chapter VI – Conclusion.
20. Kautilya has enunciated many military strategies in the Arthashastra. Most importantly he does not seem to have made much distinction between military strategy and that of statecraft. He believed that warfare is an extension and an integral part of statecraft. He has covered an array of strategies over a vast canvas from the actual fighting and planning, to training and deceit. Some of these will be discussed in this chapter.
21. Kautilya’s most striking doctrine is his discussion of planning a campaign -“The activity of one setting out on a campaign deals with the factors to be taken into account before the king (state) decides that it is in the state’s interest to commence the campaign”. Kautilya brings out the various facets of planning a campaign. He enunciates eight factors which are to be critically considered for determining whether a campaign would end in success, prior to making preparations for war. The factors that he considered for a successful campaign included Power (military, intellectual and morale), place and time, revolts and the rebellion in the rear, the calculation of losses, expenses and gains and the likely dangers of treachery. Few of the factors are discussed below:- (a) Power. According to Kautilya, the most important factor is of power. Power included the military might, and the economic strength of the adversary, and also the intellectual power, and t the ability of the enemy to carry out a objective analysis and not to be swayed by emotion or opinions. He even lists out the order of the three constituents of power to be Intellectual power, Military might and Enthusiasm and morale in the decreasing order of importance. Kautilya says that though the mightier king may be endowed with better war machinery and that he can buy heroic fighters, the Power of good analysis and judgement (which include intelligence and the knowledge of politics – the two eyes of the king) are superior to sheer military strength. The operational ‘fFactor of fForce’ as spelt out in present day warfare encompasses the tangible (personnel, weapons, mobility, fire power and logistics) and the intangible elements (leadership, morale, discipline, training, doctrine and motivation).) The human element that is the power of good counsel and intellectual power has been given the highest importance by Kautilya, unlike modern thinkers who give more importance to the military might. The intangible human elements are difficult to quantify and hence tend to tilt the balance if not correctly assessed. Hence to compare two opponents as emphasised inemphasised in the Arthashastra ,Arthashastra, their power in all aspects needs to be compared. Kautilya gives least importance to morale but adds that ‘Tthe night before the battle is to be used for preparing for battle and building up the morale of troops’. (b) Place/Terrain. The next important factor to be considered is the place andplace and the terrain. Employment of infantry, horses, elephants and chariots have been given the due importance with respect to terrain. He has articulated that the land being used for conflict should be unsuitable for the enemy and suitable for own operations. This terrain is a smaller manifestation of the operational ‘Factor of Space’. as given in the present day references on Operational Factors. The present day conventional warfare propagates that the free movement of one’s forces and the space available are crucial for success in war. An example of denial of space is the concept of Blockade. Thus the importance of space was evident to Kautilya except the new concept of cyberspace. However his postulate that on each kind of space the king should undertake such works to increase his power is still relevant. (c) Time/Campaigning Season. Kautilya has laid stress on timing and selection of season for an expedition. He recommends that the climate and the time or duration of a campaign (day, night, fortnight, month, season) is of great importance. His concept of space is replicated as he articulates that the time of conflict should be unsuitable for the enemy and suitable for own operations. He also states the various kinds of warfare and weapons to be used in different seasons . ‘An army consisting mostly of elephants should be used in rains or when plenty of water is available, camels and horses may be used in little rain or areas with muddy water’. The operational factors in modern warfare give serious consideration to the factor of time. Time has further been divided into preparation time, warning time, reaction time, decision cycle time etc. Durations of the campaign and the interval between two consecutive operations should beare kept short to be maintain a high tempo. This is brought out by Kautilya when he recommends that ‘whenever the king is superior, he shall not waste any time and should proceed against the enemy whenever by doing so the enemy can be weakened or crushed’. Due to new technologies the pace of thein present day warfare new technologies are enlarging the area of combat is growing and at the same time compressing the time factor is being compressed. Thus tThe critical evaluation of time, and the various weather parameters and advices such as theand terms for planningfor planning a long, medium and short war as given in the Arthashastra remain relevant even today. (d) Troop Mobilisation. He Kautilya lays down the criterias in great detail which are required for mobilising each kind of troops. like Tthe standing army, is to be chosen if the threat is great and from well trained troops, however the territorial army is to be chosen if the enemy is weak. Tthe militia or is to be mobilised if the enemy is weak and it is only a law and order problem. Ffriendly or allied forces. are to be used when the king and the ally have the same objective. Without any remorse he adds that the jungle tribes should be used when there is a gain to the king, whether they win or lose in fighting the enemy – ‘Just as a Chandala stands to benefit when a wild dog fights a wild boar’. Combat potential concept in the present day concepts operational art states that combat potential is converted into Combat power by mobilisation of troops and start of conflict. Even Kautilya has rightly emphasised the importance of troops and thus their bearing on the factor of force. Kautilya prefers an army of trained Kshatriyas or a large force composed of Sudras and Vaishyas. He was the first Indian statesman to consider the lower castes to fight wars. (e) Other factors. The other factors he discusses in planning include the revolts and the rebellion in the rear, the calculation of losses, expenses and gains and the likely dangers of treachery. Thus Kautilya has also brought out the fact which present day planners also abide by; of not planning or initiating military action without adequate forces and in the presence of unreasonable military or political constraints. Though most planning is valid only till the first contact with the enemy, still a complex almost mathematical analysis of gains and losses was carried out to justify going to war. (f) Power Place Time relation. The relationship of power, place and time to wage a war had various interpretations during that period. However Kautilya has clearly enunciated that though each of these components is important, none is more important than the other and all are interdependent. The fact that Kautilya understood the concept of space-time-force relationship and dynamics is a revelation. He postulated that only when the king finds that he is superior in power space and time shall he proceed against the enemy. “Force is important for a campaign; just as the collision of an unbaked mud-vessel with a similar vessel is destructive to both, so war with an equal king brings ruin to both…place (space) is important as a dog, seated in a convenient place, can drag a crocodile and a crocodile in low ground can drag a dog…time is critical as during the daytime the crow kills the owl and at night the owl the crow.”His analysis of Force-Space-Time in the quote shows that the correct forces need to be deployed in the correct terrain at a time of their choosing for maximum effect. The analogy of the crocodile being dragged by a dog would refer to a vastly superior force being inexorably drawn away from their base into an area of operations that is favourable to the smaller enemy (large conventional forces fighting insurgents in urban areas). All the factors listed by Kautilya need to be considered whilst planning a modern day conventional or unconventional campaign.
22. Physical Security. The security of own kingdom consisted of physical security and also the capability to prevent treachery, revolts and rebellion. The frontier post and forts (consisting of mountains, rivers, jungle and deserts) provided physical security. The details of fortifications are placed at the Appendix _______. Thus the importance given to internal security was immense. Demobilisation of troops was carried out in times of peace to save money and they were mobilised again for conquests. However the forces guarding the forts, royal property and the kings own guards were never disbanded, thus ensuring the importance of internal security. Besides Kautilya was extremely wary of revolts, rebellion and the ability of spies trying to influence the people by wrong newstreachery. 23. Control Over Army. Various means were utilised by the king to maintain control over his army including the Chiefs of Army such as paying them well, keeping them under surveillance and testing their integrity to prevent any rebellion.. Some of these measures including shrewd and ruthless ones are enumerated below:- (e) They were paid well to prevent them from being tempted by bribes by the enemy. (f) They were kept under surveillance of clandestine agents, especially to see that they did not succumb to the instigations of the enemy. (g) Their integrity was tested to weed out the cowardly. Also the (h) Tthe wings of the Army were kept under the control of more than one chief so that mutual fear and suspicion would ensure their loyalty. (i) 24. (a) Those suspected of treachery were posted to remote areas while their families were kept in the capital as hostages. Imperativeness of Security. Kautilya believed that offensive action is based on defensive power. His insistence of for internal security clearly underlined underlines the fact that before forces are committed to the main task all own vital and vulnerable targets should be secured. In fact he even advices the king to keep the treasury and army under his control. In case of a threat of revolt, Kautilya advices the king,not to remain behind in the capital and to allow his Commander to lead a campaign and to leave it to his Commander and remain behind in the capital, .in case of a threat of revolt. 24. This coupled with the fact that he attached great importance to controlling his army brings out the fact that internal security must be the sound foundation for a successful campaign. 25. Threat of Coup. Kautilya advised the king not to leave military matters entirely to others and be involved in it. He paid great importance to the training of the army and to the loyalty of the soldiers. Towards this he advocated the use of spies especially from threat of a coup. Kautilya recommended that “secret agents, prostitutes, artisans and actors as well as elders of the army should ascertain with diligence, the loyalty or disloyalty of soldiers”.
26. According to Kautilya, the king had two main responsibilities which included the protection of own state from external aggression and enlargement of territory by conquest. He thought there was a ‘science’ of warfare, presumably part of a larger science of politics.  Kautilya has described four types of War as follows:- (a) Mantrayuddha or War by Counsel. This is the exercise of diplomacy to win wars. This is to be utilised when the king is in a weaker position and engaging in battle would not be wise or beneficial. (b) Prakasayuddha or Open Warfare. This is the form of normal warfare which follows all laid down rules of fighting a battle. Open warfare, Kautilya declared, is ‘most righteous,' but he was willing to use any and all kinds of warfare to achieve consolidation and expansion of the kingdom. Kautilya advised the king that “When he is superior in troops, and when he is on land suitable to himself, he should engage in an open fight. In the reverse case, (he should resort to) concealed fighting.” This was quite unlike the teachings in the Indian epics which emphasised the Dharmayudha or ethical warfare. (c ) Kutayuddha or Concealed Warfare. This form of warfare includes psychological warfare and treachery in the enemy’s camp. Also known as Guerrilla warfare. The Chinese civil war by the People’s Liberation Army, the Vietcong in the Vietnam war, the Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo are examples of using mobile military tactics to defeat a stronger force. and guerrilla warfare. (d) Gudayuddha or Clandestine / Silent War. This type of war is waged by covert means to achieve the objective. It includes means to win without fighting the battle by means such as assassinating the enemy. Also called silent war, it is a kind of warfare with another kingdom in which the king and his ministers—and unknowingly, the people—all act publicly as if they were at peace with the opposing kingdom, but all the while secret agents and spies are assassinating important leaders in the other kingdom, creating divisions among key ministers and classes, and spreading propaganda and disinformation. Roger Boesche has said in his book on Arthashastra that “silent war is a kind of fighting that no other thinker I know of has discussed”. The assassination of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi carried out towards furthering separatist movements are examples of this kind of warfare. In silent warfare, secrecy is paramount, and, from a passage quoted earlier, the king can prevail only by “maintaining secrecy when striking again and again.”
27. The military organisation is covered in great detail in Arthashastra. Maintenance of the state’s armies, troops and the organisational structure of various components are still valid. The organisation was based on the number ten and as today we follow the relationship of three. In the olden days since space was limited, it was perhaps possible to have a commander controlling ten subordinate commanders. 28. Managing the Army. He further warns against calamities which adversely affect the functioning of the army which include not giving due honours, not paid sufficiently, low in morale etc. Kautilya states that armies should never be abandoned, left leaderless or totally merged into someone else’s army.ItThe army should always have adequate reinforcements. He further warns against calamities which adversely affect the functioning of the army. He includes many factors such as not giving due honours, not paid sufficiently, low in morale, an angry army, a dispersed one, having to fight in an unsuitable terrain or season, an army which has been encircled, obstructed or cut off from reinforcements and supplies and most importantly one without leaders. He makes an incisive observation when he states that an unhonoured army, an unpaid army an exhausted army will fight if honoured, paid and allowed to relax respectively but a dishonoured army with resentment in its heart will not do so. He further gives importance to leadership qualities by stating that an army repulsed will fight if rallied by heroic men unlike an army abandoned by its chief. This is as true today, even in the age of C4ISR. and where troops or ships are spread across the globe. It is an accepted fact that in the absence of an inspired leader victory goes to the stronger (numerically superior) side. He also adds that even if the army faces extreme reverses like loss of capital or death of a commander it will still fight unless they are cut off from their king and leader. He stated the pre requisite for an effective leader which is true even today that he should keep in mind two fundamental elements, the mission and the people. The king is advised to guard his army against troubles created by the enemy and told to strike at the weak points of the enemy’s army similar to the critical vulnerabilities in JOPP.
29. When two kings are at war, he advises his king to sue for peace with a stronger king, accept the peace offer of a equally strong king and to destroy the weaker king. He justifies going to war by the natural enemy concept which states that if the conqueror does not eliminate the enemy, the enemy will eliminate him. After victory it is vitally important to consolidate on newly acquired territory so as to be able to embark on further conquests. He clarifies that a defeated army should never be harassed to the point of making it so desperate that it will return to fight with vengeance.
30. A whole section is dedicated to oligarchies or confederacy. In the present world such a communion is exhibited by coalition forces. While accepting that these coalitions are strong entities he frames various means to fight and put up resistance against them. As an oligarchy is defined as a unassailable cohesive unit, sowing dissension, using deceit, treachery and playing on the differences amongst them has been suggested as measures to defeat them. In the present world, the attempt to break the coalition by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein is an example of this tactics.
31. Kautilya has written extensively on the response of a weak king when being attacked by a stronger king. When confronted by a superior power Kautilya advices the weak king to find a way to survive to fight another day, preserving “his body, not wealth; for, what regret can there be for wealth that is impermanent?” Kautilya did not however expect the weak king to give in to the conqueror without a fight and recommended various measures which included use of ‘diplomatic or concealed warfare’ and instigating a revolt in the enemy camp.As a desperate measure he even advocated a powerful speech offering a mixture of moral exhortation and arguments to be given to the superior king.
32. Kautilya maintained that people were more important than forts and armies. As he put it, “one should only seek a fortress with men.” Kautilya urged the king to be popular with the people and to endeavour to secure the welfare of his subjects. The Arthashastra has emphasised on not causing harm even to the subjects of the enemy king. In fact extra ordinary measures are recommended to win over the people of the enemy land. Their customs had to be respected and their gods had to be revered by the new king. After the war, carrying away loot was forbidden. 33. The important six fold foreign policy has been left out due to dissertation restrictions. The gamut of strategies from the planning aspects, the types of war to the very crucial support of the people will be will be contextually examined for their relevance in the next chapters.
34. Realist School. In this chapter the present day conventional warfare will be examined as seen through the prism of Kautilya. Kautilya is widely known to have preached the Realist School of thought which advised rulers to maximise power through political rather than military means. He preached that the ends justified the means including the use of ruse, deceit, cunning and subterfuge. However Kautilya has discussed conventional warfare in great detail and has also given the option of frontal attack on the enemy. 35. Role and Mission. In an increasingly complex world, the missions of the armed forces are correspondingly more diverse and complex than ever before. In times of peace and tension, the armed forces are a powerful instrument of the nation’s foreign policy. In times of crisis and conflict, they are the foremost expression of the nation’s will and intent. Suffice to say that the expectations of a nation from its military are diverse and wide-ranging. Therefore, modern warfare is not restricted to war alone. Rather, they encompass the military, political, economic and the diplomatic aspects. 36. Nature of War. War or conflict has two different characteristics. One, which represents progress and change, and the other, which represents constancy and permanency. On one hand, the dynamics of progress and change depend much upon a commander’s imagination, innovativeness, grasp of technology and complexity. While on the other, the Arthashastra is testimony to the constant and unchanging nature of war. Studies of military history show that certain features constantly recur; that certain relations between type of action and success often remain the same; that certain circumstances and moments have time and time again, proved decisive. Past being the prologue of future, underscores the relevance and significance of studies of military history such as propagated by the Arthashastra.
37. Factor of Space. The relevance and importance of planning in present day warfare is evident by the stress on the use of Appreciation and now on CES and JOPP. The fact that these instruments allow detailed planning to foresee almost every eventuality justifies the shift to newer instruments like JOPP. The identification of the Area of Operations (AO) and the Area of interest (AI) constitute the first steps towards planning the battle space. Detailed analysis is thereafter carried out as also put forth in the Arthashastra on the factor of space. The weather, terrain and geography are given importance besides factors like demography, economy, natural resources and economy. 38. Factor of Time. The factor of time is used to analyse the time factor to own and enemy forces with respect to preparation time, reaction time, transit and deployment time to name a few. As emphasised by Kautilya, one of the most important factors related to time is to determine the duration of the war. Incorrect understanding of this vital factor can have serious repercussions on force planning, doctrine and outcome of war. The 1967 Arab -Israel war was swiftly accomplished in six days, one day longer than that was planned. The factor of time was adequately planned for by the Israeli forces. Another critical factor related to time brought out by Kautilya is the weather. The detailed planning carried out to predict the correct weather during Normandy landing emphasises this fact. Any mistakes would have been catastrophic for over two million allied troops. 39. Factor Force. The factor of force includes all sources of military power. Though military theory cites a force ratio of three to one between attacker and defender, the quality of weapons and intangibles like morale and psychological factors can play a decisive role. Military cohesion or the bonding together of individuals is an important factor as can be seen in the cohesion at unit levels. “Sections of the army should consist mostly of persons from the same region, caste or profession.” Kautilya was suggesting that men of an army should know one another and that an army of friends fighting side by side is the most difficult to defeat. The factor of force involves identifying and evaluating the enemy’s forces and its capabilities, limitations, doctrines, techniques and procedures. The relative Combat power and potential is also brought out in this step. 40. Interdependence of Factors. The interrelation and correlation of the space-time-force as put forth by Kautilya is the essence of the entire step. Thus planning for conventional war has changed little especially with respect to these basic factors.
41. Presently, national and international interests have become vulnerable, with no clear indication of how they can best be protected and the concept of national security itself is changing constantly.The attacks on Mumbai on 26 Nov 08 perpetrated by terrorist groups exposed the porous coast and the loopholes in the security setup of India. The events of 11 Sep 01 in the US, and the attack on our Parliament has also exhibited that nobody is free from such attacks. Thus the internal security of India is of paramount importance. Some of the measures taken to rectify the situation include the erection of the fence at the LOC, strengthening the intelligence setup by setting up of Multi Agency Centre (MAC), up gradation of training of Coastguard personnel and formation of crisis management teams. However, Kautilya had already written about these measures. “The various kinds of dangers are: that which is of external origin and of internal abetment; that which is of internal origin and of external abetment; that which is of external origin and external abetment; and that which is of internal origin and of internal abetment. Of these four kinds of dangers, Internal danger should first be got rid of. For internal trouble, like the fear of a larking snake, is more serious than external troubles.”
42. Conventional warfare espouses the use of ‘Open warfare’ as Kautilya named it. The Arthashastra describes in great detail the standard battle-arrays and its composition, the types of arrays and the reasons for choosing them. Great emphasis is placed on reserves behind every battle-array and this is where the king stations himself. Preference for mountains or forts to station the reserves is shown.
43. The organisation as laid down by Kautilya catered for civil supremacy and ensured effective coordination between the various components of the Army. The essential structure has tended to remain the same with few modifications. Most of the thirty four different calamities mentioned by Kautilya which affect the fighting of an ideal army are relevant even today. Thus honour, pay, terrain, morale logistics, and other factors still hold true and are crucial factors for success of the military. Trends that are bound to effect the organisation and structuring of Indian Armed forces include the low probability of all out wars and security interdependence between nations in form of coalitions. 
44. While planning an operation and deciding whom to attack Kautilya advices to ensure that the gains outweigh the losses. While discussing gains he talks about the importance of enemy’s mines, productive forests, elephants, water works and trade routes. Oil is the subject of much dispute today. Oil resources were the bone of contention during wars with Iraq in 1990 and 2003. The third version of the Arab Israeli war prompted the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) to assert the use of ‘oil weapon’. Similarly water, has the potential to become the major critical issue. Alvin Toffler in his thesis of ‘Clash of Waves' predicts a series of wars between economies that have stepped into the ‘information age’ (third wave) and those still in the ‘industrial age’ (second wave). The Gulf War to a great extent proves the theory of Toffler and what Kautilya always believed that wars will occur for economic reasons.
45. When survival is at stake, the soldiers are strongly motivated as it is a matter of life and death. The Soviets fought in World War II for their survival. Arthashastra addresses this fact when Kautilya advices to let the enemy soldiers know that the defeated soldiers would not face reprisals. After such humanitarian policies toward the defeated populace have become widely known, ordinary enemy soldiers will surrender in great numbers. By contrast, if a king announces that he will massacre every soldier, then all will fight to the death. He added that a broken enemy should not be harassed. Similarly, he advised that “to fight with brave men who have given up all hope of life is a rash deed.”
46. The support of the population is an essential requirement in the present age for going to war and for supporting its sustenance. Failure or setbacks in war can have a harmful impact on the commitment of the population to back the policy, and drastic action is often required to restore confidence. During the Falklands War, for example, the British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher demanded some operational success to offset the impact on public morale and support for the war after the loss of HMS Sheffield to an Argentinean Exocet missile, against better military judgement
47. Conventional wars or Open wars, have become the exception rather than rule after the second world war. The number of conventional wars fought is extremely low compared to the number of sub-conventional wars which numbers well over a hundred. The mightiest Empires that ever existed—the British, the French, Americans (in Vietnam), the Soviets (in Afghanistan) have tried their hand at this kind of war and failed. The role of conventional wars is expected to decline further. Though other factors also played a role, by far the most important reason behind the small number of conventional wars, has been the increase in nuclear weapons and nuclear states.
48. Kautilya in his treatise has already put forth an elaborate and systematic plan of action for conventional war. Studies and analyses of wars tend to deeply influence military thought, doctrines, concepts, war-games and principles of war. As a result, more often than not, strategies and tactics employed in the later wars have been influenced by those employed in the previous ones. Therefore the study of the Arthashastra should be encouraged (to prevent reinventing the wheel) and the planners and tacticians should put into practise the valuable teachings of Arthashastra.
49. Fourth generation warfare (4GW). Fourth generation warfare, describes the process of collapsing the enemy internally and attacking the enemy’s will. Targets include population’s support for war and enemy’s culture. The distinction been war and peace, military and civilian is blurred. 4GW does not attempt to defeat the enemy in the battlefield. It is political, socially networked and protracted in duration unlike the technology intensive, short conventional wars. Insurgency and terrorism comprise 4GW and these methods date back to classical antiquity. 50. Kautiliyan Insights. The Indian Army and lately the Indian Navy (to some extent) are engaged in an ideology based counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaign. In order to succeed, a deep understanding of the historic template and strategic culture of the enemy is required. The only effective tool against this insurgency and wave of terrorism is to strike at its roots. Kautilya’s work encompasses all facets of warfare as known to us today. A critical analysis of the writings of Kautilya in the Arthashastra gives us a clearer picture of the enemy and key insights on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism philosophy that may be employed to win the War on Terrorism. The Arthashastra had foreseen unconventional warfare and it is imperative that we examine what Kautilya has to offer us.
“An internal rebellion is more dangerous than an external threat because it is like nurturing a viper in one’s bosom”.
51. Depredation by Armies. Kautilya addresses insurgencies under the chapter – “Calamities due to Acts of Men”, thus acknowledging that most insurgencies are created by failed policies of the state. He also speaks about the harassment by own army being serious and states that such harassment needs to be countered by destroying the leaders of such harassment. 52. Internal Strife. Kautilya argued that a state facing internal strife is either in a state of decline, stability or advancement depending on its ability to tackle the situation. This philosophy is applicable to states facing internal rebellions (insurgencies) wherein states that have chosen to ignore their internal problems are in a state of decline viz. Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Serbia and Zimbabwe. States that are actively countering their internal strife and remaining stable are China, India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. States that have successfully countered insurgencies and forged ahead in the global comity are South Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). 53. Influencing the Population. The battle for control of the population is, today, the major characteristic of an insurgency with both the insurgents and the counter-insurgents vying for the popular support of the population. Bogged down by their inherent weakness against the much stronger state actor, the insurgent has to choose a battle ground, where his chances of improving his odds are much higher – amongst the local population. If an insurgency wins the hearts and minds of the populace using humanitarian or economic assistance, religious fervour or coercion, it is extremely difficult for the counter-insurgency effort to gain a foothold. 54. Popular Support-COG. Kautilya proposes that a conquering king should show the same devotion as the local people towards their gods and customs and equally participate in their festivals (assimilate their culture). Further, the rulers should not repeat the mistakes of the previous regime- “Having acquired new territory, the conqueror (occupier) shall substitute his virtues for the enemy’s vices and where the enemy was good, he shall be twice as good…all prisoners shall be released on a special amnesty.” This has remarkable similarity to the situation faced by countries around the world. The Indian Army’s approach consists of Winning the Hearts and Minds (WHAM) of the populace while preventing the insurgents from getting the support of populace. One of the methods of achieving this is by physically isolating the insurgents. However, “the US led forces in Iraq remain handicapped by techno lust and are well short of mastering the software that exists between the ears of the local population.” Thus popular support and opinion is a centre of gravity in counter insurgency.
55. Kautilya’s Thumbrule. An analysis of most insurgencies in the world shows that Kautilya was accurate in his belief that the greatest cause of insurgencies was societal discontent and advocates that the state attach great importance to the well being of the people -“If they become impoverished, they become greedy and rebellious”. The types of rebellions (insurgencies) were classified in their seriousness based on the affected region and who were their sponsors. Kautilya’s thumbrule for determining how to deal with insurgencies is tabulated below. The similarities in the methods used today and those espoused by Kautilya are striking. Kautilya proposed the use of four instruments of state power – Conciliation (Diplomatic), Dissension (Informational), Force (Military) and Gifts (Economic), which are the instruments used by states even today (DIME). Although application of his principles would depend on the extenuating circumstances of a case, his thumbrule gives us a basic framework for planning a counter insurgency operation.
Instigator Abettor Seriousness Tackle the Method 1. Internal External Least serious Abettor Conciliation or Gifts 2. External Internal 2nd least Abettor Dissension or Force 3. External External 2nd most Instigator Dissension or Force 4. Internal Internal Most serious Instigator
56. Indian Approach. In the Indian context the insurgency movements have been carried out by believing that there are no military solutions but resolution depends on political dialogue. Thus the parties involved have been given political compromises including creation of new regions (Concilation and Gifts).  However unlike Kautilya the Indian counter-insurgency has hinged on isolating the insurgents from the people, saturating the area with troops and most importantly in a clear diversion from Kautilya by limiting the quantum of force and thus reducing the level of violence. 57. Welfare Measures. Kautilya established the world’s first ‘Welfare state’, in which the state controlled and contributed to all aspects of daily life, ensuring equality and fairness in distribution of resources, benefits and wealth. His premise was that it was in the ruler’s self-interest to be generous to the people, provide employment, build roads, harbours and parks and to address grievances of people quickly. Kautilya’s pronouncements are mirror-imaged in present day counter-insurgency theories which lay great stress on social equality and some measure of distributive justice. Kautilya also understood that fair taxation would build popular support for the state and that an onerous tax burden would make the ruler unpopular and the victim of an insurgency. Tax rates were, thus, fixed according to one’s ability to pay – “The king (state) should take from the kingdom fruits as they ripen, as from a garden; he should avoid unripe fruit that causes an uprising, for fear of his own destruction”. 58. Democratic Ideals. The importance of a feedback mechanism from the population is almost idolatry in Kautilya’s ideal state. He mentions that the ruler must be willing to hear grievances from his subjects – “Arriving in the assembly hall, he should allow unrestricted entrance to those wishing to see him in connection of their affairs..” The modern applicability would be that a state must open channels of communication with the people. He suggested that the king should not rule in a monarchist manner . “Rulership can be successfully carried out only with the help of associates. One wheel does not turn alone. Therefore, he (ruler) should appoint ministers and listen to their opinions.” Thus, Kautilya, writing the Arthashastra just 50 years after Plato penned his ‘Republic’, stresses the need for a democratic system of governance and a system of direct contact with the masses to avoid internal strife, which is the essence of successful counter-insurgency. 59. Religiosity.In reading the Arthashastra, one is struck by the primacy given to the power of the state over religious edicts. In ancient India, such thoughts were considered blasphemous. Kautilya however preached that religion had to be separated from politics for running a prosperous and efficient state. That ancient wisdom is as relevant today as it was in 300 BC. The world’s most authoritarian and suppressive regimes today are those which place religion above the rule of civil law and liberties. 60. Civil Rights and Police Powers. Kautilya’s Arthashastra mentions rights of the individual citizen and civil liberties. There was considerable freedom of speech and expression, a prerequisite for an effective and vibrant state – “Actors may, at will, entertain by making fun of the customs of countries, castes, families, schools and love affairs”. There were, however, instances where the police was given overriding powers to arrest citizens – “One travelling frequently, one travelling at an odd time in a solitary place, one always staying indoors, one entertaining a feeling of hostility and one who becomes anxious when he sees an official”. Kautilya, however, laid a caveat to counter-balance these sweeping police powers – “…a hefty fine in case punishment is inflicted on those not deserving to be punished”. This was also enforced by a strong and impartial judiciary. This practice is prevalent even today, where certain rights of citizens in areas affected by insurgencies are curtailed in order to enforce law and order. 61. Judiciary. Kautilya insisted that it was most important that laws be clear, be applied equally to all concerned and be backed by the power of an effective state. In discussions of how the king should use Danda (Rod or Punishment), Kautilya said – “The only way by which a man might be kept pure and righteous was by fear of Danda… In the absence of a king or when people do not fear Danda, the inevitable result is anarchy and internal strife.” However, Kautilya was not proposing a dehumanising or despotic regime which terrorise their populations into meek submission. He writes further – “For, the king, severe with the Danda, becomes a source of terror to beings. The king mild with the Danda is despised. The king who is just with the rod is honoured. If not used at all, it gives rise to the law of the fishes. For the stronger swallows the weaker in the absence of the wielder of the Rod.” 62. Urban Counter-Insurgency Operations. In situations of urban warfare (against a fortified enemy city), he explicitly stated that indiscriminate bombing (use of fire) would be counterproductive -“…fire shall not be used at all. For fire is a divine calamity whose effects are unpredictable; it is a destroyer of uncountable numbers of people and wealth. Even when captured, such a fort would only give rise to further losses.” The applicability to modern day urban counter-insurgency is implicit; the application of mechanised warfare and firepower (or excessive airpower) would almost never work in an urban environment as a military victory would still leave the combat zone broken and the population distraught as was seen during the Israel Hezbollah conflict of 2006.
63. Importance of the Army. Kautilya was an advocate of a large standing army to counter threats to the state. He negated the concept of using mercenary troops as used in Kashmir by Pakistan. For him, the strength of the standing army and the treasury (economy) were two sides of the same coin. Each had the task of defending the other, with the ultimate aim being the maintenance of peace and harmony within the state – “For, the army is the means of acquiring and protecting the treasury…the calamity of the treasury is calamitous”. This is synonymous with protecting one’s national resources viz. oil, natural gas and vital infrastructure from terrorist or insurgent attacks as they support the economy, from which the state derives its power. 64. Kings Own Guards. Kautilya advocated the creation of a force to protect the leadership of a state, a key feature of counter-terrorism operations today -“Just as a king watches over the security of others through secret agents (synonymous with the RAW or IB), so shall a wise king guard himself against dangers from others”. In spite of the detailed rules laid by him to ensure the ruler’s security, Kautilya despairs and states that the king was only safe from external threats; his biggest threat was dissent from those close to him. The force was never demobilised unlike the rest of the armed force.Though Kautilya deeply believed in the security of the king, the present day situation of guarding 13000 VIPs across India is stretching the police and the National Security Guard (NSG) thin. In any case as Kautilya preached, the politicians should first provide security to the people before ensuring their own security. 65. Securing the Borders. Arthashastra is amongst the earliest works to stress the importance of immigration and emigration control by defining a “Superintendent of Passports”. A passport and a permit (visa) were needed to enter or leave the country. The emphasis on such accounting and screening of the populace exists even today. 66. Torture. Kautilya is unique as a political writer due to his lack of inhibition in discussing the role of torture as an instrument of the state to elicit information. While the use of various types of torture has been a distinct feature of humanity throughout the ages, its various facets and nuances were first discussed in the Arthashastra. Kautilya states on the subject of torture – “… one should put to torture one about whom there is a strong presumption of guilt … a prisoner should be tortured only on alternate days or he may declare himself guilty out of fear or desperation”. The moral and ethical dilemmas facing modern states make justifying torture difficult, as an instrument of their counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist operations. However, the speed and lethality with which insurgents and terrorists can strike targets has made the information they possess extremely time-sensitive. He describes with remarkable candour the general rules for torture. However, there was a counter balance as personnel conducting the interrogation were to be severely punished in case of a wrongful custodial death. 67. Concealed War. Kautilya laid great stress on “Concealed War” or misinformation campaigns which are synonymous with Information Operations and Psychological Operations. Use of agents in the enemy territory as well as infiltrators in enemy ranks to conduct Psy ops and sabotage was considered a prerequisite for any operation -“Miraculous results can be achieved by practicing the methods of subversion”. The aims of the clandestine agents conducting these operation were -“Assassination of enemy leaders, surveillance on enemy territories, psychological warfare and sabotage.” Recognizing that the enemy could also launch a misinformation campaign against one’s own state, the Arthashastra also advocated campaigns in one’s own country to bolster public morale and support. These tactics are commonplace in today’s electronic age and must be used effectively to maximise the effect of massed public opinion against the enemy even before first contact is made. This technique of “Concealed War” is being used very successfully both by insurgents / terrorists and in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations by modern states. The policy adopted by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) against India to destabilise the country, and the covert support to LTTE in Sri Lanka by India are instances where this stratagem has been adopted. 68. Espionage and Counter-espionage. Kautilya devoted an entire chapter on the importance and use of spies for advancing the interests of the state. Kautilya’s massive spy networks were also a means of collecting valuable public opinion Kautilya also speaks of frequent surprise inspections of public service institutions to ascertain their fairness and effectiveness. The intelligence gathered from roving spies was to be collected in the “Establishment of Spies” . The agents had their identities protected to prevent being compromised; the central establishment itself did not know the identity of the agents. Kautilya also realised that his own kingdom was susceptible to espionage and therefore detailed a comprehensive counter-espionage mechanism using double agents. 69. Silent War (Political Assassinations). The Arthashastra is also very clear on the use of political assassinations to solve internal and external problems. Assassination is described as “Silent War” or the “Weeding of Thorns”; Kautilya implies that certain circumstances require the state to assassinate an enemy leader rather than allow him to gain a position of power which is inimical to the security of the state. The Arthashastra is very liberal on how to assassinate enemy leadership with methods ranging from drowning, burning, suffocating with smoke and even poisoning – “…by hiding inside the image of a deity or a hollow wall, and emerging at night, by making something heavy, or serpents or poisonous fire drop on the enemy (king)”. The wonder of assassination, according to Kautilya, is that it is extremely efficient and cost beneficial -“For, an assassin, single handed, may be able to achieve his end with weapon, poison and fire. He does the work of a whole army or more”. This policy is often applied by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a pre-emptive measure to prevent suicide attacks with some success. 70. Means for Weak King. The various means mentioned for the weak king to achieve victory are viable means to be used even in the present day to achieve victory. The asymmetric use of force or pretending withdrawal, infiltrating inside enemy territory, weakening the powerful enemy by opinion of other kings (World opinion) or weakening the enemy by spies and use of propaganda have been covered in detail by Kautilya. These methods are being used in the present world by the conventionally inferior insurgents or terrorists to upstage big powers.
71. Kautilya’s approach to counter-insurgency operations, places a great deal of emphasis on addressing the root cause of the problem, such as economic or social distress. However his counter-terrorism efforts are more aggressive and attempts to eliminate the menace and its popular base.The arguments of Kautilya still hold water in this age and it would be wise for the policy makers to turn towards solutions proposed by Kautilya over two millennia ago.
72. Is Kautilya Relevant? The study of warfare examines the unchanging qualities of human nature in the constantly changing material and technological dimensions of military conflict. So it is only natural that the question arises ‘Is Kautilya relevant?’ especially as warfare has been transformed due to technological advances. Today the world can be destroyed in a matter of minutes, the range of weapons is the entire world, victory is often meaningless, no two wars seem to be alike and avoiding the involvement of populations is almost impossible. Hence can the simple framework of war which existed centuries ago be put to use today? 73. Longevity of Arthashastra. Unlike many authors and even modern texts, Kautilya does not give only a one sided account. He caters for the application of his strategies both by his king and his enemies. An example is the use and counter use of deceit and intelligence procedures. Also Kautilya is an exception to other authors of ancient texts as he was actually able to marshal his thoughts, to the realm of practicality leading to the creation of a huge empire. The Arthashastra goes into the details of every topic be it the administration, economics, foreign policy or warfare. . He does not just preach truisms that are vague but he attempts to answer all the perplexing questions the reader might have. 74. Types of War. Kautilya has explained the four different types of war likely to be undertaken by own and enemy forces. Identifying the nature of war is of prime importance. In the two Gulf wars, Saddam Hussein failed to grasp the power of the Coalition, especially after his success against Iran. Similarly the Coalition forces are struggling to achieve the political aim of stability and peace in Iraq and Afghanistan due to their incorrect appreciation of the kind of war they were faced against. His concept of concealed and silent war articulated centuries ago are a glove fit for the present day guerrilla warfare and the fourth generation warfare. While Kautilya has covered the genesis of these warfare, he as also explained on the various means to fight such menaces. He has mentioned deception tactics of feigning weakness. 75. Enemy’s Will. While writing CES and JOPP the term ‘Enemy’s Will’ is a much used term. Though many believe that the term is abused for the lack of original thinking the fact remains that mostly intelligence provides estimates of only tangible factors, however the intangibles like Enemy’s Will may decide the victor. Arthashastra enunciates the close examination of enemy’s will by familiarity to his religion, culture, beliefs and politics besides the use of superior intelligence through spies. In the Gulf war both sides were found lacking in their appreciation of this factor. Kautilya’s stress on psychological warfare to destroy the enemy’s will to fight and his meticulous understanding of the psyche when he states that an enemy without any hope of escape is extremely dangerous is the stroke of a genius. 76. Planning. The planning factors discussed by Kautilya are still in vogue in the CES and JOPP. His thesis that the factors of power, time and space are interdependent is a master stroke and true to this day. His raison d’être of going to war and methods of engaging the enemy are vital considerations even in present days war and conflicts. His factors to determine the strength of the king point out the rationale followed for going to war along with the minute calculations and the systematic decision making processes that were followed. 77. Internal Security. The aspect of internal security is most important in the subject of defence of a state. Hence, a long-term strategy for internal cohesion must be developed based on Kautilya’s principles on internal security. 78. Weak King. Arthashastra states that the weak state should dictate the terms of the battle to a stronger enemy to avid defeat. The various methods suggested include convincing the stronger king of the futility of his effort due to an impending bloody battle or use of diplomatic pressure. This remains true even today as the states which want to avoid conflicts, to deter the high costs, are put on the back foot and on the defensive. 79. Peaceful Rule of Acquired Territory. Arthashastra’s articulates that victory on the battlefield is not the final remedy, but it is the acceptance of the final outcome by the defeated side. Thus peace and prosperity should be the end state, which requires concerted political and diplomatic effort, besides meting out good treatment to the people of the defeated land. 80. Intelligence. Kautilya has rightly driven home the importance of “Actionable Intelligence’, the lack of which caused the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. He emphasises that intelligence is a force multiplier. His meticulous intelligence organisation provided him with the most accurate insights into the mind, intentions and capabilities of the enemy. 81. Arthashastra-Unethical? Some may argue that Kautilya’s Arthashastra is an unethical and totalitarian treatise on a form of governance that was more suited to the ancient world rather than our modern moralistic society. His cynical view of the world, inclusion of torture, assassinations and proxy wars seem inconsistent with his proffered status as a great ancient political thinker. Nothing could be farther from the truth; Kautilya’s work presents a balanced view of the basic framework of a successful society and placed great emphasis on the welfare of the populace. He makes it abundantly clear in the book, however, that the purpose of statecraft or diplomacy (both sanguine and coercive) is the furtherance of the state’s national interests. 82. Counter-Insurgency/Counter-Terrorism. Kautilya’s approach to counter-insurgency operations would thus have greater emphasis on attacking the root causes of most insurgencies – social and economic distress rather than attempt to solve the insurgency using armed force or its threatened use. Counterterrorism, however, would have to be more aggressive using all available means to isolate the perpetrators and eliminate their leadership and their popular base. The aims of modern terrorist organizations are more violent and they are better trained in the art of war. Their vast finances, availability of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on the black market and the difficulty in penetrating religious extremist organisations necessitates a paradigm shift in counterterrorist operations towards that proposed by Kautilya. 83. Learning from Arthashastra. Any indifference to connect present day policies and strategic environment with Indian history will hinder the ability of strategy makers to learn from history and make the correct choices. Jawaharlal Nehru has long been criticised for being aware of Kautilya’s geopolitical strategy and still following an idealist policy of Non-alignment. and Panchsheel. In hindsight, probably we would have done well to follow Kautilya. It is ironical that it is Pakistan whose strategy seems to be inspired by Kautilya’s principles! 84. Study of Arthashastra? Superior technological advances were a force multiplier in the Gulf war. However better technological prowess or economic strength alone cannot provide a decisive victory in war as was seen during the IPKF operation in Sri Lanka and the US operations in Vietnam. While soul searching for their defeat in the Vietnam war the US war colleges turned to Sun Tzu and understood that war and politics cannot be separated. Kautilya has also disseminated that political support and the support of the people is essential for wars and victory. In his treatise he has beautifully inter woven the harmonious balance amongst the three pillars for success in war namely the military, the government and the people. Still we seem to be enamoured by the Clausewitz Trinitarian model which propagates the same concept. Therefore the question arises that ‘Shouldn’t the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) and other Indian institutes of repute comprehensively study the Arthashastra? 85. Way Ahead. The limited books available in the DSSC library and the glancing mention made in précis and lectures are testimony to our disregard for Kautilya’s treatise. It is clearly evident that Kautilya has touched upon every aspect of warfare, besides that of administration, economy and foreign policy. Throughout our country the lack of research on propagating the teachings of Kautilya is evident by the very few books in the country and papers on the internet. We will be empowering ourselves if we are able to comprehend, assimilate and apply Kautilya’s wisdom. In today’s world, the challenges of global security are no different from the challenges that vexed the Mauryan Empire in 300 BC. A cogent and dispassionate analysis of the Arthashastra reveals stark similarities between the problems faced by Kautilya’s ideal state and the modern scourge of terrorism and insurgencies. Scientific techniques tempered by the application of high technology have failed to dent the practitioners of these reprehensible deeds; it is perhaps time for humanity to turn the clock of learning backward and delve into its past to obtain an ancient remedy for this modern malaise. Present day conventional and 4GW adhere to ancient patterns and we need to believe that they can be overcome by age old techniques. After all, the truism that ‘those who forget the lessons of history are condemned to repeat it’, is most true in the world of military affairs.  VK Subramanium. Maxims of Chanakya. New Delhi.Abhinav Publications. 1980. p.1  Pravin Chandrasekhran. Kautilya:Politics, Ethics and Statecraft. Havard University/Havard Kennedy School. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 05 May 06. Romila Thapar. Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300. California. University of California Press. 2004. p.175-177 Radha Kumud Mookerji. Chandragupta Maurya and his Times. Delhi. Moltilal Banarsidas. 1988. p.31-32.  Roger Boesche.Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.p.10-12 Lt Gen (Retd) SK Sinha. Former Vice Chief of Army Staff.present Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. The Chief of Defence Staff. IDSA-Journal for defence studies. Aug 07. Vol1. No.1  Pran Nath Chopra, BN Puri, MN Das, AC Pradhan. A Comprehensive History of Ancient India.New Delhi. Sterling publishers. 2005.p. 84  Sugata Srinivasaraju. Year of the Guru. Outlook Magazine 27 Jul 09. p.20-22  The ancient literature in India has divided the great aim of human endeavours (purusharthas) into four parts. These include Dharma(moral behaviour), Arta(wealth), Kama(worldly pleasures) and Moksha (salvation). Dharma has the highest significance and is followed by Artha.  LN Rangarajan. The Arthashastra. New Delhi. Penguin Books, 1987. p.13-14.  Balbir S Sihag. What Kautilya would say. Pragati- The Indian National Interest Review.No 11 Feb 2008. https://pragati.nationalinterest.in/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/pragati-issue11-february2008-communityed.pdf. Accessed 22 Sep 09.  Charles Waldauer, William J Zahka, Surender Pal. Kautilya’s Arthashastra:A neglected Precursor to Classical Economics. Indian Economic Review, Vol XXXI No.1, 1996, p.101-108  Roger Boesche, Kautilyas Arthashastra on war and diplomacy in ancient India. p.10  Ibid.  R Shamashastry. Transalation of Kautilya’s Arthashastra..p.8  GN Pant. Studies in Indian Weapons and Warfare. New Delhi. Shobha Printers.p.249. The Mauryan empire had a Navy and each ship was 75 tons. There was a regulation to destroy pirate ships. Ashoka had a Sea going Fleet and a full fledged Naval department.  R Shamashastry. Op Cit.p.78-82.  LN Rangarajan.Op Cit. 267-268.  Ibid. 787-788.  Ibid. 256-269.  Ibid. 183.  Rangarajan, Op Cit. 177. R Shamashastry. Op Cit.p.40.  Roger Boesche, “Han Feizi’s Legalism Versus Kautilya’s Arthashastra,” Asian Philosophy Vol15, No. 2, July 2005.p165.  AL Basham. The Wonder that was India.p.51.  Roger Boesche.Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.p.15  Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.p. 36.  The Mandala concept, describes the relations between the states. The relationships are based on a simple principle that two states sharing a common border will have diverse interests and hence are likely to be intrinsically hostile to each other. The kingdom which has a common border with an enemy but does not have a common border with the conqueror is called an ally. A powerful king whose territory is not contiguous with that of the conqueror, the conqueror’s enemy is called a neutral.  Abridged Minor Research Project.Chanakya’s Arthashastra and its Relevance in Modern Warfare. Trishul Vol XVIII No.2. Spring 2006.p.81.  Rangarajan. The Arthashastra.p.625.  M Vego. Introduction to Operational Art. US Naval War College. Newport. https://www.au.af.mil/au /awc /awcgate/opart/opart_nwc.pdf. Accessed 03 Dec 09.  Rangarajan. Op Cit.p.628.  AK Srivatsava. Ancient Indian Army. New Delhi. Ajanta Publications.p.108. The various rewards for slaying enemy kings and chiefs also were announced.  R Shamashastry. Transalation of Kautilya’s Arthashastra.p.528  Kangle. Part II. Op Cit. pp 442-443.  Kangle. Part II. Op Cit. p 442-443.  Ibid.  R Shamashastry. Loc Cit.p.628.  Kangle. Part III. Op Cit. pp 256-257. Kangle. Part II. Loc. Cit. Shamasastry. Op Cit. Pp 372-373.  R Shamashastry. Op Cit.p.629.  R Shamashastry. Op Cit.p.493.  Capt. Wayne P Huges USN (Retd). Fleet Tactics and Coastal Command.Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000, p.164.  Kshatriya (Hindi: ????????) meaning warrior is one of the four varnas (social orders) in Hinduism. It traditionally constituted the military and ruling order of the Vedic-Hindu social. Kshatriyas were considered to be the highest ranking of the varnas.  Shudra (Hindi: ?????) is the lowest Varna in the traditional four-section division in the Hindu caste system. Their assigned and expected role in post-Vedic North India was that of farmers, craftsmen and labourers. The four Varnas are Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra.  R Shamasastry, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra Book IX-The Work of an Invader, Chapter 1-The Knowledge of Place, Time, Strength and Weakness; The Time of the Invasion,” https://www.bharatadesam.com/literature/kautilya_arthashastra /arthashastra_9.php (accessed 20 Apr 2008)  Rangarajan. Op Cit. p.157  R Shamashastry. Op Cit.p.22.  Rangarajan. Op Cit. p.676.P.676. LN  Roger Boesche.Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.pp.15RB  VR Ramachandra Dikshitar. War in Ancient India. New Delhi. Motilal Banarsidass. 1944.p.81-89  Roger Boesche.Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.pp.15Ibid.  Ibid.  ‘Guerilla Warfare’. It is sometimes also referred to as Partisan and originates from Spanish: ‘Guerra’meaning war. Guerilla warfare is usually employed almost exclusively in situations of Asymmetric Warfare. It encompasses the usage of ”terror” techniques, but largely employs unorthodox forms of warfare. It is used commonly in rebel uprising and rebel insurgence against an installed government usually motivated by political, sectarian (and in some cases humanitarian) purposes.  Ibid  Roger Boesche. The First Great Political Realist. Kautilya and his Arthashastra. Maryland.USA. Lexington Books.2002.p82.  Roger Boesche.Op Cit. p.80  R P Kangle. The Kautilya Arthasastra. Part II University of Bombay, 1972. Pp 442-443.  R Shamashastry. Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Translation. p.539.  Kangle. Part II. Op Cit. pp 179-180.  Kangle. Part III. Op Cit. pp 259.  R Shamashastry. Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Translation. p.379.  R Shamashastry. Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Translation. p.367.  Roger Boesche.Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.pp.23-24.  Jerrold M. Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile https://law.case.edu/ grotian-moment-blog/documents/saddam_hussein_political _psychology_profile.pdf  Roger Boesche. Op Cit.p 23.  Roger Boesche. Op Cit.p 25.  MV Krishna Rao. Studies in Kautilya.Delhi. Munshiram Manoharlal publishers.1979.p99. Kautilya preached that there are six methods of foreign policy. These are making peace, waging war, staying quiet, preparing for war, seeking support, and the dual policy of making peace with one while waging war against another. One’s circumstances will dictate which methods should be used.  Asif Haroon Raja. Indian Psychological Warfare Threat. https://www.asiantribune.com /node/11144. Accessed 22 Dec 09.  Rahul K. Bhonsle. Jointness: An Indian Strategic Culture Perspective. Journal of Defence Studies. Aug 2007. Vol1. Issue1.  R Shamashastry. Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Translation. p.525.  Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal India’s Foreign Policy : A Muddle for Sixty Two Years. Indian Defence Review Issue: Vol 24.4 Oct-Dec 2009 https://www.indiandefencereview.com/2009 /12/indias-foreign-policy-a-muddle-for-sixty-two-years.html  Roger Boesche.Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India.p.27  Dr Martin Edmonds. Defence and Security in the 21st Century. https://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ Monographs/No9/Edmonds.htm. Acessed on 20 Dec 09.  R Shamashastry. Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Translation. p.506.  Abridged Minor Research Project.Chanakya’s Arthashastra and its relevance in modern warfare. Trishul Vol XVIII No.2. Spring 2006.p.88.  Kautilya said that having women in an army is a calamity, and they should be removed from the army for success. Howeverthis is due to the beliefs and pressures of the times he livedin. Also throughout his treatise his immense respect for women and their abilities has been appreciated.  Yardley , Michael and Sewell, Dennis, “ A New Model Army”.,NewYork.  Energy and International war: from Babylon and beyond. P.16  Energy Security:Managing risk in a dynamic legal and regulatory enviornment  Alvin Toffler. The Third Wave. Collins, 1980. Pp 27,31,42. Alvin and Heidi Tofflers’ Third Wave category of warfighting ability. Essentially, they argue that there is an immutable relationship between the manner in which societies create wealth and the way in which they fight wars.  Robert Greene.33 Strategies of War. Profile Books. 2008. Robert Greene named the term. In 1519, Hernán Cortés led an expedition to conquer the Aztecs. When he arrived in Mexico, his men grew fearful of the fierce warriors.Cortés sank his ships so his soldiers could not run away. Left with no option, they fought and won.  Roger Boesche. Op Cit. p.32  Dr Martin Edmonds. Defence and Security in the 21st Century. https://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ Monographs/No9/Edmonds.htm. Acessed on 20 Dec 09.  Martin van Creveld. Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview. Discussion paper. https://www.dni. gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2004_05_25_papers/modern_warfare.pdf. Acessed on 19 Dec 09.  The three Indian-Pakistani wars of 1947, 1965, and 1971. Next come the five Arab Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1969-70, and 1973. Others were the Korean War of 1950-53; the Indian-Chinese War of 1961; the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88; the war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1978); the Chinese attack on Vietnam (1979); the Falklands War (1982); the Kosovo Campaign (1999); and, of course, the two wars against Iraq (1991 and 2003). The Kargil and the Israel Lebanon conflicts may also be added.  Martin van Creveld.Op Cit.  A concept defined by William S. Lind(American expert on Military Affairs) and expanded by Col (Retd)Thomas X. Hammes( US Marine Officer , a specialist in Counter-Insurgency)  William S Lind,Colonel Keith Nightengate,Captain John F Schmitt(USMC), Colonel JosephW Sutton(USA) and LT Colonel Gary I Wilson(USMCR). The Changing Face of War. New York. Routledge. 2008. p.15.  Thomas X Hammes. War evolves into Fourth Generation. New York. Routledge. 2008. p.42.  Colonel Arun Nair. What is Fourth Generation warfare. DSSC. Trishul Vol XXI No.2.p.1. The author argues that while asymmetric warfare is an engagement between players, 4GW is a generation change. However,insurgency and terrorism form a part of 4GW.  Antulio J .Echevarria II. Deconstructing the theory of Fourth Generation Warfare. New York. Routledge. 2008. p.58  Sunil Beta Bhaskar. The War on Terrorism. https://www.sunilbetabaskar.com/host /waronterror/. Accessed on 24 Dec 09. The author has given an lucid definition and explanation of Terrorism and Guerilla warfare especially in the Indian context.  Rangarajan, The Arthashastra, 160  Roger Boeshe. The first great Political realist:Kautilya and his Arthashastra. P 99 Colonel David P. Anders. United States Army developing an Operational Level Strategic Communication Model for Counterinsurgency. US Army War College 2009.p.1  Rangarajan, The Arthashastra, 740  R Rajagopala. The Indian experience of fighting 4GW. New York. Routledge. 2008. p.264  FG Hoffman Combating fourth generation warfare  Rangarajan, Op. Cit. p.157  Colonel Chet Richards(USAF, Retd), Ll Colonel Greg Wilcox(USA,Retd), Clonel GI Wilson(USMC, Retd) America in Peril- Fourth generation warfare in the twenty first century. . New York. Routledge. 2008p.124  Rangarajan, Op Cit. p.162.  R Rajagopala. Op Cit. p. 265  Ibid. p. 269.  Chuda Bhadhur Shreshtha. Nepal, coping with Maoist Insurgency.Katmandu. Chetna Lohshum. p.21  Boesche, Kautilya and his Arthashastra,p. 72  Ibid. p. 41  Rangarajan, Op Cit. p.177.  Gabreil Abraham Almond, R Scott Appleby, Emmanuel Sivan. Strong Religion: The rise of fundamentalisms around the world.p.236  Rangarajan, Op Cit. p.61  Ibid.p. 458  Rangarajan, Op Cit.p. 467  Boesche. Op Cit. p.36  Rangarajan, Op Cit.p. 735  Daneil L Nelson, Laura Neack. Global Society in Transistion: An international politics reader.  Rangarajan, Op Cit.p. 152.  Rangarajan, Op Cit.p. 677.  Vinay Kumar, The Hindu, Home Minister wants debate on VIP security., Jun 29 2009  Rangarajan, Op Cit.p. 72.  Christine Farina, Torture through the ages. https://www.albamy.edu/scj/jcjpc /vol9is1/farina.pdf  Rangarajan, Op Cit.p. 467  Terrorism, Counte terrorism and torture. Report. https://www.redress.org/publication/ Terrorism report.pdf  Rangarajan, Op Cit.p. 519.  Ibid.p.507.  KM DeSilva. Reignal Power and Small state Security: India and Sri Lanka 1977-1990. p.7  Rangarajan, Op Cit.p. 505.  Roger Boesche. The First Great Political Realist. Kautilya and his Arthashastra. Maryland.USA. Lexington Books.2002.p.51.  Boesche. Op Cit. p.91.  Rangarajan, The Arthashastra , 498  Asaf Zussman. Evaluating the effectiveness of Israeli Counter Terrorism Policy using Stock market data. . Journal of Economic perspectives Vol20 issue 2  Michael I Handel. Masters of War, SunTzu ,Clausewitz and Jomini. Oregon.USA. Gainsborough House. p.1  Ibid p.2  Russell D. Howard and Reid L Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and Interpretations Connecticut: Mc-Graw Hill/Duskin, 2002.p. 75 Edward A. Kolodziej, Roger E. Kanet. From Superpower to Besieged Global Power.  Shekhar Adhikari. Modern Srategic Thought. Machiavelli to Nuclear Warfare. New Delhi.Kilaso Books.p.301-302  Michael I Handel. Masters of War, SunTzu ,Clausewitz and Jomini. Oregon.USA. Gainsborough House. p.11.  During the research for this dissertation a glimpse of the chapters in MW 23 on ‘Principles of War’ and Development of Strategy was most disappointing. Though every concept has been dealt with by Kautilya, he does not find a mention in these chapters amongst the other greats of history!
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