Never forget. The press is the enemy. The press is the enemy.
“Richard Nixon, in a recording with Henry Kissinger, 1972
In November 1972, Richard Nixon enjoyed one of the largest electoral college victories in history, winning all but one state and 60% of the popular vote. Not even two years into his second term, in August 1974, his fifteen-word resignation letter ended the Nixon era, one characterized by scandal, corruption, and subterfuge. This drastic shift in public opinion in a relatively short period of time was nearly unprecedented. What caused Nixon's demise? And to what extent did the news media play a role in his downfall? The key factor to understanding Nixon's fall from grace is to look at the tactics and policies of the media in shaping and influencing public opinion. The dogged reporting by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward at The Washington Post tracked Watergate from start to finish, revealing the depth of the corruption in the White House. Their investigative tactics coupled with the sensationalization of Watergate by The New York Times, NBC, and CBS, galvanized public opinion against Nixon and contributed to his drop in to popular support to 24% by early 1974, culminating in members of his own party turning against him. The news media's skillful handling of Watergate dictated the narrative surrounding the scandal, thereby eroding the presidential mandate and compelling the Republicans in Congress to call for Nixon's resignation.
The unrelenting investigative rigor of Woodward and Bernstein at The Washington Post transformed an otherwise innocuous event into the catalyst for Nixon's resignation. On the night of June 16th, 1972, five burglars broke into the DNC headquarters at Watergate Complex in Washington D.C. All five were carrying expensive equipment, including cameras, bugging equipment, and walkie talkies to communicate with a lookout across the street. Despite the obviously professional nature of the attempt, White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler referred to the event as a third-rate burglary. It seemed as if the rest of the news media shared his sentiment: most papers ran a single story and then abandoned the topic all together. In fact, of the 433 correspondents in D.C. at the time, only 15 worked on Watergate full-time. Even Bob Woodward, later the key Watergate reporter, was irritated by the scale of the story: he thought that a burglary at the local Democratic headquarters was too much like most of what he had been doing. However, Woodward and another young Washington Post reporter, Carl Bernstein, became intrigued by the story once they discovered that James McCord, one of the burglars, was on the payroll of Nixon's Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP). This was the first link that suggested collusion between prominent Republicans and the attempted DNC burglary. While other papers turned their attention to the upcoming presidential election, Woodward and Bernstein focused on uncovering further links between Nixon's White House, including through the use of anonymous sources, sometimes criticized by their editor, Katharine Graham, which allowed them to stay ahead of the other reporters. Their most valuable source was high-ranking FBI agent Mark Felt, who was nicknamed Deep Throat in order to preserve his anonymity. Felt was able to corroborate news from other sources as well as share information from the FBI investigation of Watergate with Woodward and Bernstein. It was Felt who, in a deliberately vague choice of words, informed Woodward that Watergate was a matter of national security and a bigger story than anyone could have predicted. With Felt's guidance, Woodward published a story titled FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats. This article sparked enormous fallout from the White House; Felt called Woodward and told him that would be their last call, as the White House was determined to find out who was leaking information to The Washington Post. The expose suggested that Nixon had not only been complicit in Watergate, but indeed had been actively undermining the Democratic Party for years. Barry Sussman, the city editor at the Washington Post, stated, We've never had a story like this. Just never. The Washington Post's unyielding search for the truth produced serious results. In 1973, the paper was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in Public Service for its Watergate story. By that April, 83% of the American public had heard about Watergate. Nixon's approval rating had fallen to 48% and he was forced to fire two of his top aides, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichmann. In private, Nixon was deeply afraid. Late in 1972, he said Never forget. The press is the enemy. The press is the enemy. Nixon's fear was real. The media had successfully splashed the president's illicit criminal activities all over the front page.
The investigative and sensational tactics employed by the media brought about a crucial shift in public opinion. Most people learned about Watergate from the media rather from family or friends, meaning that presentation of the information was as important as the information itself and the papers played a key role in determining the public's initial reaction to the events. On the eve of Nixon's resignation, only between one and two out of ten [Americans] were unhappy with the outcome... Seldom, indeed, had there been a greater display of national unity. The media was the key agent of change driving the dramatic transformation of Nixon's historic popular mandate to unified public support for his resignation. Those targeted by the president in the aftermath of Watergate knew to harness the power of the media to further their cause. During the Saturday Night Massacre, Nixon's attempt to fire his special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, led to the resignation of his Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, as well as his Deputy Attorney General, William Ruckelshaus. Nixon's effort had taken place on Friday, the night before a three-day weekend and government holiday, a carefully-calculated effort that he believed would stem the flow of media attention due to the lack of media coverage during the holiday. He thoroughly miscalculated Cox's determination, however, as Cox held a televised press conference the day after in order to delegitimize Nixon's efforts. Cox's rebuttal caused the nation to rally behind him, with some studies suggesting upwards of 300,000 responses sent into the White House in the following days. The live unfolding of the scandal demonstrated the power of television in mobilizing sentiment. Cox's staff also televised FBI agents barring them from their offices, highlighting the force the White House was willing to use against Cox and further shocking the public. Nixon's attack backfired further with the public, as an NBC news poll showed a plurality of U.S. citizens now supported impeachment of Nixon, with 44% in favor. Congress took note, and with that imperative, 21 members of Congress introduced resolutions calling for Nixon's impeachment. The Saturday Night Massacre proved to be a tipping point for Nixon, as he was never able to win back the support he had lost (see appendix 1). Cox's skillful handling of the media proved to be a deciding factor in the public's shifting view of Nixon.
Moreover, sensationalist tactics as seen in the case of Nixon's released tapes also proved influential in shaping public opinion. Nixon was advised by his aides to release the edited transcripts of many of his tapes in order to curry favor with the public. This would prove to be one of the White House's greatest miscalculations, as early reports suggested that the general public would have neither time nor motive to dig through the transcripts, thus the gesture would be taken as one of goodwill. However, the media refused to let the story rest. The New York Times and Washington Post immediately rushed paperbacks with the transcripts into print, which became bestsellers. More importantly, television stations like CBS and NBC decided to broadcast live reenactments of the tapes, with actors playing Nixon and his former top aide, H.R. Haldeman. In this way, the transcripts were disseminated across America, reaching those who would not have read them otherwise. Directly after this media frenzy, Gallup conducted a survey asking people how their opinion of Nixon had changed since his speech and release of the tapes. As Gladys Lang puts it, Of those who said they had watched or read about the speech [concerning the tapes], 42% now had a less favorable opinion of Nixon, 35% felt as before, and only 17% had developed a more favorable opinion. Moreover, the media played an important role in filling gaps in public knowledge. A 1974 Roper survey suggested that people who understood the idea of impeachment were more likely to favor it than people who had to have the idea explained to them. The media's ability to turn complex topics into easily-consumable soundbites was essential to Nixon's loss of support.
Due to this drastic shift in public opinion, the Republicans who had once been his staunchest defenders were forced to reconsider their support of him. The year that Watergate broke, 1974, was a Congressional election year, and many Republicans feared that the tide of anti-Nixon sentiment would affect their reelection chances. A New York Times article from 1973 states, There is the Watergate burden on Republican candidates next year... Senator Bill Brock of Tennessee, chairman of the Senate Republican campaign committee, said last week that Watergate was a pervasive issue in the coming campaign, one that had severely wounded the Republicans. Republican incumbents recognized the shift in public favor was detrimental to their reelection. While some senators continued to support Nixon, many others chose to call for his resignation in the hopes of winning back some goodwill from their voters. As U.S. News puts it, [Nixon's] effusive support evaporated with Watergate...many of those who pulled the lever for Nixon in 1972 clamored for his ouster in 1974. Statements made by former Nixon supporters suggest that Republicans were deeply concerned with Nixon's sinking popularity. James L. Buckley, a former CREEP chairman, penned an op-ed titled Why Richard Nixon Should Resign the Presidency. In it, he states that Nixon had been stripped of the ability to fulfill [his] mandate and that there was a pervasive and undeniable sense of frustration and impotence that has become the dominant political mood in the nation. By referring to the loss of Nixon's mandate, Buckley echoes the concerns of many Republicans who realized that a president with only 24% support simply could not speak for all Americans (see appendix 1). The president's impotence in the face of the scandal disgusted the American people, making him a poor leader. Moreover, Buckley thought that a new president would be able to reach out to the people with the restored authority and moral strength that is so essential an ingredient of the Presidency. Nixon's loss of popular support had rendered him helpless. The American people desired a President with moral strength, a quality Nixon no longer possessed and could never again possess. Another prominent Republican, Senator Edward W. Brooke, called for Nixon's resignation because he didn't think the country could stand more of the trauma it has had in recent months. Nixon is no longer an effective leader, Brooke said, because he has lost people's confidence. The American people no longer trusted Nixon, and by extension, were wary of the Republican Party. Moreover, Richard Nixon himself believed that public opinion was the critical factor in what he called the ?overriding of [his] landslide mandate. Nixon's fight to remain in office was a race for public support. Nixon recognized and respected the importance of public opinion, and knew that the lack of it would cause his impeachment. Indeed, Nixon's gradual slide in the polls was the force that drove him from office. Congressional Republicans were willing to take more forceful measures in order to distance themselves from Nixon and thereby increase their reelection chances, as the erosion of Nixon's popular support, largely driven by the media's influence, continued.
The lessons of Watergate, rather than being confined to the past, echo into our own present, our current White House, and the growing suspicion that history may be repeating itself. The same tactics that the media employed to mobilize public sentiment against Nixon are being employed today in much the same way against President Donald Trump. With Nixon, the charges were domestic spying; with President Trump, collusion with a foreign body, but the heart of the matter remains the same. Strong investigative reporting from the Washington Post revealed burglars on the payroll of Nixon's CREEP; strong investigative reporting today reveals National Security Advisor Michael Flynn's controversial ties to Turkish and Russian interests. The media sensationalized Richard Nixon's tapes by acting them out on live TV; today, sensationalization takes place with satirical skits from shows like Saturday Night Live. Richard Nixon called the media his enemy; so does President Trump. The mediums have changed somewhat with the invention of the Internet - about 38% of Americans get their news from social media and websites - but the role of the media remains the same. It has the power to influence public opinion and inform public sentiment. When the American people cannot place their faith the executive, legislative, or judicial branches, they must turn to the free press to conserve and protect American ideals.
Never forget. The press is the enemy. The press is the enemy.. (2020, Feb 26).
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