The Sale of Goods Act 1979

Long established precedents exhibited a contradiction made amid a sale of distinct items against one of goods by depiction. The former necessitating the purchaser to examine the goods and rely on personal awareness: caveat emptor, while the latter evincing the reflection of the goods with their contractual specifications. In a sale of unrecognized goods, reference to chartered description could only determine the features. This question calls for a study over the credenda of Implied Obligations which is concealed by the Sale of Goods Act 1979[1]. In order to compute the distinctive aspects of the proposal, the key substratum of Sections 13 and 14, citing a benchmark and quality of goods shall be abstracted.

However, the core constituent of the analysis would be the scrutiny of each situation with the interpretation of variegated case law precedents cultured with time, statutory prerogatives and judicial maxims. (a) Primarily, half of the wine stock Rowena bought from Vic Ltd. was undrinkable yet such quota of ineffectuality was habitual for a matured drink of that sort. This signals a demanding assessment of the Sections 13 and 14 of the SGA 1979, correspondingly. Sale by description is the core potential behind the operation of S. 13. Initiating the statute, S. 13(1) holds that in the course of a contract, it is connoted that goods will match with their depiction[2]. In Varley V Whipp,[3] it was held that the buyer’s dependence on the description revealed that sale by description was the essential term in the contract. S.13(3) expresses that if the goods are chosen by the buyer, there may be a deal by description and this has been demonstrated in Beale V Taylor,[4] where the buyer, purchasing the car after a thorough examination, was held to have intended to buy it through description rather inspection hence making it a sale by description. The Court of Appeal, in Re Moore & Co Ltd. and Landauer & Co’s Arbitration[5] noted that the purchaser was permitted to reject the items under S. 13 and Lord Atkin stated: “There is, therefore an implied condition that the goods when tendered shall resemble with the description……the purchasers were permitted to discard the whole”. Contrarily, in Arcos Ltd. V EA Ronaasen & Son,[6] the House of Lords, upheld the buyer’s right to decline for the breach with valid description and Lord Atkin held: “A ton does not signify roughly a ton, or a yard roughly a yard”.[7] Detectable words in a contract are part of the item description and there is an antithetical congruity between those relating to quality and characteristics. In Proton Energy Group SA V Orlen Lietuva,[8] the descriptive words ‘Oil blend’ in Clause 2 were held to be a part of the contract description under S.13. However, whether the vintages’ degree of satisfactory quality has to be now evaluated. S. 14 of the SGA 1979 encompasses provisions whereby ventures on the section of the dealer as to the nature of the items and their adequacy for a precise function, are foreshadowed into particular course of dealings. Hosting particular exceptions, the fundamental dictum of ‘caveat emptor’ administers this prospect of the precedent of business and this approach is engrained by S.14 (1). Corresponded by S.14 (2), under a commercial dealing, there is a meant indication that the goods are of a decent caliber.

This falls beneath a legislative exception accompanying S.14 (3) and exclusively exercises “where the dealer markets the items”[9]. A matter that if one sells “in line of commercialism” where one’s business does not usually contain that of selling items, or of specific items, has now been deciphered by the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Stevenson V Rogers[10], enouncing that the sale was made “in the course of” that business so as to escort the agreement within the ambit of S. 14. Likewise, the goods should be of “merchantable value” and appropriate for all purposes as per its definition in the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. LJ Norse, in Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises V Christopher Hull Fine Arts Ltd[11] was of the view that the description must be influential to the extent of being enforceable. There cannot be a sale by description where there is not a review of the parties that the buyer is relying on his own skill.

Moreover, was the wine fit for the purpose under S.14 (3)? The courts have adopted a proposition that where the goods have a distinguished function, that deems to be their “particular” purpose. Food, for example, would be appropriated for the purpose of being consumed (Wallis V Russell)[12], milk to be drunk (Frost V Aylesbury Dairy Co.)[13], and a hot water bottle swelled with hot water to warm a bed (Priest V Last)[14]. This backs the notion of aptness for purpose and the courts have adopted this expansive understanding to assist the buyer in the context of widespread remedies in a consumer sale. Assessing the facts in the light of the case law, it is viable to say that although Rowena did not taste the wine, it does not necessarily mean that she did not look at the bottles. If she had examined the stock, she would have already know about their undrinkable quality and age. In such a condition, Vic Ltd. would not be held liable but if she has not, the seller would not be held guilty. (b) The second portion revolves around the doctrine of awareness in the context of the quality of the wine and the defects. Rowena did not inspect the bottles at the time of the purchase and later found them to lack exclusive quality which she expected.

Moreover, the fraud by the French producers of the wine also emerged. The quality of the wine, as discussed in the previous part, is defined under S. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Goods are credited to be of a satisfactory quality if they meet the standard of a judicious person, considering their narrative and other aspects (S.14 (2A) SGA 1979). In Bernstein V Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd[15], it was held that the car was likely to be unmarketable. Arguably, albeit the wine did not fall in the category of a fine, pleasant drink, it was of a satisfactory quality. It’s worth and value equated to the one consumed by a reasonable person customarily. Moreover, S.14 (2C) of the SGA 1979 stipulates that if the buyer reviews the goods before entering into a contractual settlement, then the implied term as to the quality ceases. In Thornett & Fehr V Beers & Sons[16], the defendants had inspected the goods and there was no implied arrangement that the glue was of merchantable quality. Likewise, in the celebrated case of United Central Bakeries Ltd V Spooner Industries Ltd[17], it was stated by Lord Hodge that the check of satisfactory quality is on a complete objective base and the court situated itself in the independent reasonable purchaser with knowledge of all the applicable facts and Spooner was held to be in breach of the implied condition under S. 14(2). Moreover, the express term in Dalmare SpA V Union Maritime Ltd[18] did not omit S. 14 which had been breached.

Rowena did not taste the wine before obtaining the stock from Vic ltd. hence it can be indicated that the implied term as to the quality applies in this representation. If she had inspected the wine, the term would not have been enforceable. The crux of the contractual settlement was based on a sale by description as no investigation of the wine had taken place from Rowena’s side. The quality can be reasoned on the ground of reasonableness because although the wine does not belong to a supreme brand, it still displays a satisfactory quality which fulfills S. 14 (2A). Sections 14(2D) and (2E) of the SGA 1979 encompass the ‘relevant circumstances’ in S.14 (2A) by containing any public declarations about specific features of the items. If they are mislabeled, by the vendor himself, his representative or the manufacturers, the vendor may be held accountable. However, there are some departures to this rule.

Primarily, if the vendor was not and could not rationally have been aware of the statement[19] and secondly, the client’s choice to buy the goods was not influenced by the statement.[20] Henceforth, in the situation presented, if either of the exceptions exist, Vic Ltd. can escape its accountability. (c) Advancing in the dialogue, the vintage carrying a large volume of sulphur, has to be analyzed, which poisoned a customer whom Rowena had to reimburse for the unfortunate mishap. In order to evaluate this scenario, the concept of the Exclusion of Implied Terms under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 shall be considered along with the case law precedents. In Griffiths V Peter Conway Ltd.[21], both the defendants and plaintiff were uninformed of the plaintiff’s unusual sensitivity of her skin and Branson J. dismissed the action and his ruling was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal. He stated “The specific purpose of the goods was to be worn by the woman suffering from the abnormality and if one undergoing such an illness needs an article for one’s use, desiring to acquire the benefit of the implied condition and does not notify the seller, the seller cannot exercise his or her expertise and knowledge to measure the appropriateness of the item for that particular individual”. Peter Conway can be distinguished with Grant V Australian Knitting Mills[22]. It was stated that there was a sale by description even though the plaintiff had inspected the goods because the inspection could not disclose the occurrence of the sulphites. The exact purpose needs to be made known to the seller. In Grant, the particular purpose can be implied but in Peter Conway, due to the plaintiff’s specific body condition, she must have specifically clarified her particular aim to the seller. The exact purpose cannot be implied due to her special condition. Moreover, in Christopher Hill Ltd. V Ashington Piggeries Ltd.[23], the Court of Appeal’s verdict was overturned and it was held that the seller was accountable to the purchasers for breach of S. 14(1) of the Act of 1893. It was recognized that the herring meal contained a poison, harmful to an extensive range of animals rather than only minks. Lord Wilberforce stated: “Any overall appropriateness would be the merchants’ accountability”.[24] Lord Diplock’s opinion in Ashington Piggeries was considered in Jewson Ltd. V Kelly[25] where Clarke and Sedley L.JJ., both commented on the dichotomy between S.14(2) and S.14(3). The former establishing a broad standard while the latter striking “a certain compulsion tailored to the specific conditions of the care”. As Mr. Kelly had not made his purpose sufficiently distinct to the seller, there was no breach of the implied term. In Henry Kendall & Sons V William Lillico & Sons Ltd.[26], although the component was lethal to poultry, it was impeccably appropriate for livestock and the House of Lords held that it was merchantable.

Consequently, in Cammell Laird and Co. Ltd. V Manganese Bronze and Brass Co. Ltd.[27], it was stated that the retailer was in breach of S. 14(1) and there was an implied condition that the propeller should be rationally suitable for use on the specific ship for which it was required, and it was not. Concluding the discussion, it can be stated that Rowena needs to notify Vic Ltd. expressly about the possible occurrence of such a constituent in the wine which might unfavorably affect her clients in any case.

Only if she had particularly done so, she can bring a successful claim. Bibliography Case Law: Varley V Whipp[1900] 1 513 (QB) Beale V Taylor[1967] 1 W.L.R. 1193 (CA) Re Moore & Co Ltd. and Landauer & Co’s Arbitration[1921] 2 K.B. 519 (CA) Arcos Ltd. V EA Ronaasen & Son[1933] A.C. 470 (H.L) In Proton Energy Group SA V Orlen Lietuva[2013] E.W.H.C. 2872 (Comm) Stevenson V Rogers[1999] 1 All E.R. 613 (CA) Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises V Christopher Hull Fine Arts Ltd[1990] 1 All E.R. 737 (CA) Wallis V Russell[1902] 2 I.R. 585 (CA) Frost V Aylesbury Dairy Co.[1905] 1 K.B. 608 (CA) Priest V Last[1903] 2 K.B. 148 (CA) Bernstein V Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd[1987] 2 All E.R. 220 (QBD) Thornett & Fehr V Beers & Sons[1919] 1 K.B. 486 (KBD) United Central Bakeries Ltd V Spooner Industries Ltd[2013] 150 (CSOH) Dalmare SpA V Union Maritime Ltd[2012] E.W.H.C. 3537 (Comm) Griffiths V Peter Conway Ltd[1939] 1 All E.R. 685 (CA) Grant V Australian Knitting Mills[1936] A.C. 85 (PC) Christopher Hill Ltd. V Ashington Piggeries Ltd[1972] A.C. 441 (HL) Jewson V Kelly[2003] E.W.C.A. Civ 1030 (CA) Henry Kendall & Sons V William Lillico & Sons Ltd[1969] 2 A.C. 31 (HL) Cammell Laird and Co. Ltd. V Manganese Bronze and Brass Co. Ltd.[1934] A.C. 402 (HL) Legislation: Sale of Goods Act 1979 Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 Book: LS Sealy and RJA Hooley,Commercial Law, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (4th, Oxford University Press, United States 2009) 397 Word Count: 1,941

[1] Hereafter abbreviated to SGA 1979 [2] Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 13(1) [3] Varley V Whipp[1900] 1 513 (QB) [4] Beale V Taylor[1967] 1 W.L.R. 1193 (CA) [5] Re Moore & Co Ltd. and Landauer & Co’s Arbitration[1921] 2 K.B. 519 (CA) [6] Arcos Ltd. V EA Ronaasen & Son[1933] A.C. 470 (H.L) [7] “A ton does not mean about a ton, or a yard about a yard”. [8] In Proton Energy Group SA V Orlen Lietuva[2013] E.W.H.C. 2872 (Comm) [9] Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 14(3) [10] Stevenson V Rogers[1999] 1 All E.R. 613 (CA) [11] Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises V Christopher Hull Fine Arts Ltd[1990] 1 All E.R. 737 (CA) [12] Wallis V Russell[1902] 2 I.R. 585 (CA) [13] Frost V Aylesbury Dairy Co.[1905] 1 K.B. 608 (CA) [14] Priest V Last[1903] 2 K.B. 148 (CA) [15] Bernstein V Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd[1987] 2 All E.R. 220 (QBD) [16] Thornett & Fehr V Beers & Sons[1919] 1 K.B. 486 (KBD) [17] United Central Bakeries Ltd V Spooner Industries Ltd[2013] 150 (CSOH) [18] Dalmare SpA V Union Maritime Ltd[2012] E.W.H.C. 3537 (Comm) [19] Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 14(2E)(a) [20] Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 14(2E)(c) [21] Griffiths V Peter Conway Ltd[1939] 1 All E.R. 685 (CA) [22] Grant V Australian Knitting Mills[1936] A.C. 85 (PC) [23] Christopher Hill Ltd. V Ashington Piggeries Ltd[1972] A.C. 441 (HL) [24] Lord Wilberforce at p.490 [25] Jewson V Kelly[2003] E.W.C.A. Civ 1030 (CA) [26] Henry Kendall & Sons V William Lillico & Sons Ltd[1969] 2 A.C. 31 (HL) [27] Cammell Laird and Co. Ltd. V Manganese Bronze and Brass Co. Ltd.[1934] A.C. 402 (HL)

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