Japan in its Surrounding Region




2.1 Japan in the Post Cold War World

When the Berlin wall fell, symbolizing the end of the Cold War, the global balance of power shifted from a tense military stand-off between the world’s two superpowers-the Soviet Union and United States- to one of American dominance. The end of the Cold War, which had gripped the world for nearly a half century, transformed the parameters and dynamics of international security.

The end of Cold War did not have the same, immediate impact in Asia than it did in Europe. There was no Soviet Empire in Asia comparable to the vast territories under Moscow’s control in Europe. While Communist regimes collapsed from Berlin to Moscow, Marxism-Leninism continued to be the ruling orthodoxy in the PRC, North Korea, and Vietnam. In Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall led to German unification, removing what had been arguably the greatest source of tension in European politics between 1945 and 1989. in Asia, however, disputes over national boundaries remained widespread, from the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas to the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea. Although the collapse of Soviet Union led to a considerable reduction in military tensions in Asia, the potential of conflict, if anything, increased on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.

In the bold new world, Japan continued to confront with the strategic dilemma of protecting the vital sea-lanes along with the lifeblood of its economy flowed. Historically rooted fears of Japanese military power eased somewhat, at least in Japan and South East Asia. Nonetheless, the Japanese public remained profoundly uncomfortable with the notion that Japan should assume a larger military role, and in Northeast Asia-especially in China and Korea-historical animosities emerged all the stronger.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States has also altered the world significantly. Governments around the world now realize that they are facing a new kind of threat that differs from the traditional ones. These new threat also includes various other kinds of aspects that influenced Japan’s security environment, such as Human trafficking, drug related crime, cyber crime, money laundering, Piracy, and other cross-border organized crimes.

This research applies the Neorealism assumption that structures defines a state’s behaviour, and implies Kenneth N. Waltz’s notion that a state is a rational actor that chooses its security strategy based on an assessment of its security environment. In this sense, the researcher argues that Japan’s relationship with its closest neighbours and also the emergence of the non traditional threat determines how Japan acts towards its alliance relationship with the United States in accordance with its effort on reaching security. Therefore, in this chapter the researcher will try to explore Japan’s regional environments, which will be explained through several crucial issues that Japan is facing with its neighbours.

But before that, in order to explain Japan’s position in the region, it is also crucial to understand the basic nature of Japan, including its unique pacifist policies, its dilemma on defining national interest, and also its evolving defence posture.

2.2 Japan as a Pacifist Country

Japan, or also known as “The Land of the Rising Sun”[1] is a moderately small country with a total of 377,835 square kilometres of total area and 374,744 square kilometres of land area.[2]. Japan has a Constitutional Monarchy[3] political system with its Emperor as symbol of state. It also has a Parliamentary form of government, with elected bicameral legislature called National Diet[4], consisting of House of Councillors, and also House of Representatives.[5] The head of the government in Japan is the Prime Minister, who must be a member of the House of Representatives and is usually the leader of the largest party in the House of Representatives.

After its defeat in the Second World War, Japan has been positioning itself in the relationship among nations as a pacifist country. The subsequent sub-chapter will explore more of Japan’s pacifist constitution, which has been a symbol of Japan’s commitment to peace and more importantly its renunciation of wartime militarism. The following sub-chapter will also mentions several of Japan’s basic principle on pacifism, which clearly signs its effort in war renunciation, namely those principles are the Three Principles of Arms Exports, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and also the Self-Defense Force Law.

2.2.1 Japan’s Peace Constitution

Since its promulgation in 1946, Japan’s constitution, and in particular its preamble and the article 9 “peace clause,” have occupied central positions in determining the direction of Japanese security policy. The constitution is the origin of a range of prohibitions and anti-militaristic principles that constrain Japan’s use of military force for national security ends, limiting the military to defending only the state’s own territory. It also creates significant barriers to cooperation with the United States and with the wider international community.[6]

The constitution’s preamble states Japan’s ideals with regard to security:

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. [7]

Chapter 2 of article 9 of the constitution, “The Renunciation of War,” reads as follows”:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”[8]

Article 9 is the cornerstone of Japan’s pacifism. But Pacifism alone has not keep Japan free and safe, Japan’s security has been guaranteed by the presence of American military personnel in Japan and the shelter of the US nuclear umbrella.

2.2.2 Japan’s Self-Defense Force Law

Having renounced war, the possession of war potential, the right of belligerency, and the possession of nuclear weaponry, Japan held the view that it should possess only the minimum defense necessary to face external threats. within those limits, the self defense forces law of 1954 provides the basis from which various formulations of SDF missions have been derived. The law states that ground, maritime, and air forces are to preserve the peace and independence of the nation and to maintain national security by conducting operations on land, at sea, and in the air to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression. [9]

2.2.3 Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles

As the only nation in the world to experience the disastrous effect of the nuclear weapon, the Japanese people strongly put emphasize on the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons. This notion has been firmly translated into the non-nuclear principles that Japan is upholding until now. Articulated by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967, Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear principles are:[10]

Ø Not to make such (nuclear) weapons

Ø Not to possess them

Ø Not to bring them into Japan

Japan later reaffirmed the principles when ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976 and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely in 1995. After 64 years of its promulgation, in 2009, Japan’s Prime Minister Taro Aso reaffirms that Japan would still going to adhere to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles.[11]

2.2.4 Japan’s Three Principles of Arms Exports

The Three Principles on Arms Exports prevent Japanese firms from selling military hardware and technology on the international market. Like the Three non-nuclear principles, these export restrictions were established by Prime Minister Sato in 1967.[12] Its actual purpose is for Tokyo to bar shipments to the communist’s bloc and countries on the UN sanction lists. The ban was extended in 1976 to cover all countries, but then eased in 1983 when the United States sought to buy high tech materials for its Stealth bomber fleet and for other uses.[13]

The three principles of arms exports prohibit Japan from conducting arms exports to the following countries or regions:

Ø Communist bloc countries

Ø Countries subject to arms exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution and

Ø Countries involved in or likely being involved in international conflicts.[14]

Up until today, despite increasing calls for the legislation to be relaxed, Japan has no plans to review a government policy that prohibits the export of all military equipment and technologies.

2.3 Japan’s National Interest

References to national interest constitute a new development in Japanese discourse on security. As an academic leaded term, National interest implies a host of realist assumptions concerning state-to state relations and the international system. The concept of national interests is a crucial factor to detect the policy of a state. The hierarchy of national interests can be classified into[15]:

Ø Vital, national interests are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance state’s survival and well-being in a free and secure nation,

Ø Extremely Important, national interests are condition that, if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the states government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of citizens of state in a free and secure nation.

Ø Important, national interests are conditions that, if compromised, would have major negative consequences for the ability of the states government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of citizens of a state in a free and secure nation, and Less Important or Secondary, in which national interests are not unimportant. They are important and desirable conditions, but ones that have little direct impact on the ability of the states government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of citizens of state in a free and secure nation.

To achieve and secure its national interest, a state would conduct every possible method. However, the term National interest bears a special meaning in the Japanese context. No common agreement exists among elites as to what Japan’s national interest entails. In fact, national interest is simultaneously a loaded term and a buzzword.

When used by policy-oriented Diet members- often young lawmakers in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and Democratic Party of Japan-the term loosely corresponds to the academic definition of national interest. In the case of the LDP, however, the term may also contain nationalist overtones. On the other hand, Japanese politicians also employ national interest as a form of rhetoric. For example, when justifying the SDF’s dispatch to southern Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi told the Japanese press that:

Reconstruction and stability of Iraq will be directly related to Japan’s National Interest.[16]

Alternatively, during speeches and interviews, Japanese politicians may refer to national interest out of a desire to appear intellectual.

Basically, Japan and the United States share common strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. They seek a politically stable and economically viable, open region. Both would like the US to maintain its strong presence in the region. Both want to play an active role in the field of non-traditional security.[17]

Dr Masayuki Yamauchi, the member of the Task Force Foreign Relations chaired by Special Adviser to the Cabinet Secretariat Okamoto, proposed that Japan’s national interests are almost the same as those of the United States, which shares common values such as freedom, democracy, and free trade with Japan.

According to him, Japan’s national interests are[18]:

2.3.1 Maintenance of the Peace and Security of Japan.

Security is the most vital national interest for every nation. To maintain its security, Japan as one of the world’s political leaders should engage itself actively in global security affairs. In this notion, former Prime Minister Koizumi stated in accordance with this matter in a press conference that:

“Considering the fact that the development and prosperity of Japan rests upon the peace and stability of the world, I am convinced that the assistance that Japan currently provides, which realizes the policy of the Japan-US Alliance and international coordination, is in its national interest”[19]

In a broader sense, the Japanese government also realizes that creating a secure and prosperous world is vital to Japan’s national interest, in a regional sense, Japan’s relation with its neighbours are the crucial point for this matter, this shows as the former Prime Minister Taro Aso stated in one of his speeches:

“I have already met with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao of China eight times in total. I have also held eight summit meetings with President Lee Myung-Bak of the ROK, including the one on the day before yesterday. I believe that the relations with the leaders of these two countries are the closest they have ever been in the post-World War II era. It is we ourselves who create a world that is secure and prosperous. When Japan takes proactive steps towards the realization of such a world, Japan truly furthers its own national interests”[20]

More in this notion, the then Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso mentions the importance of Japan to enhance its position in the region as a key player is stated in one of his speeches:

“Japan is a country whose own prosperity depends on the stability and peace that exists around the globe as a whole. To bring us back to the metaphor of the chain, Japan has national interests in raising the degree of the chain as a whole, even should the means be indirect.”[21]

In order to achieve security and prosperity, Japan realizes that the Japan-United States alliance is a vital element to achieve the perceived interest. Former Prime Minister Taro Aso stated in one of his statement that:

“As this issue clearly demonstrates, Japan’s security and prosperity cannot be secured through the efforts of Japan alone. First of all, it is indispensable that the effectiveness of the Japan-US alliance be ensured. This alliance is a living arrangement and not something for which it suffices simply to have a piece of treaty document. We must constantly strengthen the Japan-US Security Arrangements through unremitting efforts by both Japan and the US. At the same time, as Japan asserts its national interests and gains the cooperation of relevant countries, it must fulfil its international responsibilities in tangible ways.”[22]

“Stability was guaranteed by the Alliances among the free nations. On a global scale, balance and nuclear parity were achieved between Eastern and Western blocs. In North East Asia, the United States stood to bear the burden of security vis-à-vis the communist military colossi like the Soviets, Chinese and North Koreans, and maintained stability in the region. We owe the peace and prosperity that has been created largely to the United States. And today’s spread of democracy in the region is nothing but the result of tireless and colossi efforts by the United States to be a beacon of democracy world wide. It is only the Americans among the Western powers who shed blood of tens of thousands of nationals for the cause of freedom in the region.”[23]

Japan’s peace and security can be regarded as a vital national interest, as this is stated by Nobukatsu Kanehara, the then Political Minister of Japan in 2005:

“Japan’s grand strategy and vital interests consists in maintaining today’s strategic stability and economic prosperity of the entire region. Japan can not do it alone. Maybe no nation could do it alone. And it is naturally that the Japan-US alliance, the alliance of the two biggest industrial democracies in the Asia-Pacific region, is and will be the best vehicle to achieve this daunting goal.”[24]

“Japan is one of the major powers whose vital interests are entrusted to the stability of the world system. As Japan pursues its three major points of national interest, namely her own survival, stability, and prosperity, what is clear is that for a country of Japan’s size, no event occurring in the world can be ignored as being of no relation or interests.[25]”

2.3.2 Support for the free trade system.

It is evident that the free trade system is important for Japan to enjoy economic prosperity. Accordingly, Japan should strengthen the free trade system by establishing a network of bilateral free trade agreements and support the World Trade Organization.

“To promote democracy, free market and to enhance stability and prosperity in the region is not only Japan’s and American’s interests. It is the historic mission of the Japan-US alliance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs develops global rules for the world economy and ensures that Japan’s national interests are reflected within them, a role which is clear and which cannot be carried out by any other domestic entity”[26]

In the past, Japan has consistently supported the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since it became a contracting party to the Agreement[27]. Japan has also believes that the global economy has prospered under the open, multilateral trading system under the GATT. Subsequently after the establishment of the World Trade Organizations after the Uruguay rounds, Japan has always been a contributing supportive member[28]. It could be concluded, then, that the maintenance and strengthening of a free and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system is Japan’s fundamental policy.

2.3.3 Protection of freedom, democracy and human rights.

Freedom and democracy are Japan’s significant accomplishments since the Meiji Era. It is Japan’s duty to demonstrate a consistent commitment to the protection of these values in order to maintain regional stability.

Taro Aso stated in accordance with Japan’s foreign policy of the issue of Japan’s determination towards democracy, peace and human rights:

“Coming as we are from this background with such achievements, when it comes to talk of “universal values” that are commonly held in the world in general, whether it be talk of democracy, or peace, freedom, or human rights, Japan will no longer hesitate to state its views. This is what I am referring to when I speak of value oriented diplomacy, and my remarks to you here today constitute both a declaration of our qualifications and an expression of our determination.”[29]

Democracy, peace, and human rights have a significant portion in the conduct of foreign policy for the government of Japan. In the Charter of Official Development Assistance decided in June 1992, Japan announced that, as the basic principles in implementing its aid, it would pay full attention to efforts toward promoting democratization and market-oriented economies, and to situations of basic human rights and freedom in recipient countries.[30]

2.3.4 Promotion of people to people exchanges and development of human resources through exchanges in the area of culture and education.

Japan was the first modern country in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan put emphasis on developing human resources and it is because of the promotion of people-to-people exchange and development of human resources that Japan has flourished. It is important for Japan to continue to increase the number of people who understand Japan well.

The 1992 diplomatic blue book of Japan stated in one of its paragraph relevantly this issue:

“Japan has come to occupy an important position in the international community where interdependence among countries is growing. Overseas interest in Japan is being heightened. It is in Japan’s national interest in the medium and-long term to strengthen efforts to further deepen understanding of foreign countries toward Japan through broad cultural and educational exchanges”[31]

The Government of Japan viewed that cultural exchange with other countries is a very important means of deepening understanding of Japan on the part of other countries and promoting international friendship and goodwill. It is the intention of the Japanese government to expand and strengthen various cultural exchange activities, as a major part of its diplomatic efforts[32].

2.4 Japan’s Security Environments

Japan is located in the Pacific Ocean; it lies to the east of the Sea of Japan, People’s Republic of China, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia. Japan’s closest neighbours are South Korea, Russia, and China.[33] Based on the definition of North East Asia the researcher found, the North east Asian continent consist of the Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and the Russian Federation.[34] The second part of the chapter will try to explore thoroughly Japan’s security environments, including Japan’s neighbours, and also emerging security issues such as terrorism and international organized crime.

Before we observe specifically several number of states in Japan surrounding region, the researcher would first take a look at the trend in issue of concern in Japan’s domestic realm, which is described in the following issued by the Cabinet Office of Japan.

The above shows changes in Japan’s public concerns in terms of Japan’s peace and security. Respondents could choose three issues from a list about a dozen options. The clearly shows that their choices have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. In February 1991, when the question was fist asked, it was in the midst of the Gulf War. Naturally, most respondents (56.4%) chose the ‘Middle East Issue’, as the one that concerned them with regard to Japan’s peace and security. The second highest percentage of concern was expressed on ‘US-Soviet relations’ with 44% choosing that option: the timing was not long after the collapse of the Cold War structure. The remote third concern was ‘arms control and reduction with 18.2%. ‘The Korean Peninsula’, despite its geographic proximity, came in as the forth most selected option with 17.3%.

However, the results changed significantly in the next poll in 1994. the concern on Middle East issue dropped by two-thirds to 18.2 % and that on US-Soviet relations decreased to 31.2%, while the Korean Peninsula became the strongest concern with 34.2%, reflecting the May 1993 North Korean missile test in the Sea of Japan and the nuclear crisis of 1993-94. Since then, public concern about the peninsula has grown with 46.7% in 1997 and 56.7% in 2000 reflecting the August 1998 Taepodong missile incident and the March 1999 invasion into Japan’s territorial water by spy vessels. In the year 2003, after the December 2001 sunken spy vessel incident and the September 2002 Koizumi visit to Pyongyang, as many as 74.4% of respondents identified the Korean Peninsula as their primary concern.

The results of the opinion polls show a clear decline of concern over the US-Soviet (Russia) relations and rapid increase in concern toward the Korean Peninsula among the Japanese public. The series of North Korean provocations since the 1990s as well as the shocking revelation of the abduction of Japanese nationals after Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang attracted public attention.

The geographical proximity of the Peninsula may have made Japan’s public concern over national security more realistic than the Soviet during the Cold War period. It is then clear for us to observe, that regional concern is increased in Japan’s public attention. Therefore, in the next part of this chapter, the researcher would explain specifically several states within Japan’s regional environments and also non traditional security concern such as terrorism and international organized crime.

2.4.1 Japan’s Relationship with its Neighbouring Countries People’s Republic of China

China has the world’s largest population and a vast landmass surrounded by 14 countries. It has long borderlines and a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities[36] populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization, and pride of its unique history and the experiences of semi-colonization after the 19th century is driving a desire for a strong nation as well as fuelling their nationalism. China is state with a socialist regime, and aims at building a modern socialist state under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Part (CCP).

History plays an important role in the bilateral Japanese-Chinese relationship and has an enduring impact on the perceptions, policies and future outlook of both sides. Historical experience shapes identities, but it is also instrumentalized for pressure on the other side. Depending on the prevailing political situation at a given time. Japan and China have found reasons for optimism or pessimism about their relationship. There have been many instances where Japan-China relations have soured due to various problems originating in history. Even now, the past still haunts bilateral relations.

The problem of Yasukuni Shrine[37], school history books[38], the Nanking incident[39], comfort women[40], and also abandoned chemical weapons-these problems related to national honour and dignity have stirred up the emotions of the people of both countries.

The core elements of China’s strategic policies are rebuilding the economy and modernizing its armed forces in order to protect China’s territorial integrity, providing peripheral security, and restoring her great power status. Taiwan reunification, the defeat of Uyghur separatist in Xinjiang Province, and the defeat of Tibetan insurgency are the dominant issues under territorial integrity.

Despite the growth in China’s economic and military power over the last decade, China remains paranoid about U.S. “hegemonic” power. China perceives the United States as attempting to contain China through its bilateral alliance structure. China was extremely critical of the 1996 reaffirmation of the U.S-Japan Security Alliance by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto.

On the other hand, China supports the U.S military presence in Japan to keep the “cork in the bottle” and prevent Japan’s return to militarism.[41] Wu Xinbo concluded, in an article in 2000, that most policy and academic elites in China do not embrace the idea that Japan will become militarized and aggressive, but rather that their concern is

That the increase in Japan’s military capabilities will shift the balance of power in Japan’s favour. A militarily powerful Japan is more likely to invoke its alliance with the US to intervene should a military conflict arise in the Taiwan Straits. [42]

Historically speaking, When China tested its first nuclear device in October 1964[43], in public the Japanese government reacted very calmly and played it down, hinting at the protection given by the US nuclear umbrella. Feeling secure under the American conventional and nuclear umbrella, Japan was not overly concerned about China becoming a nuclear power in 1964.[44]

When Prime Minister Yoshida travelled to Europe in 1955 he indirectly criticised the USA’s confrontational approach to Asian communism by stating in a policy paper that ‘in fighting communism, political and economic strength was as important as military might, if not more so'[45] The Military Modernization of the People’s Republic of China

In recent years, Japan has become increasingly concerned about Chinese military modernization and behaviour. In its 2006 defense white paper, the Japan Defense Agency stressed that China’s defense budget was doubling every five years and that at the current rate, China’s official reported defense expenditures would surpass Japan’s defense budget by 2009. It also noted that China’s actual defense expenditures could be higher because all equipment procurement and research and development costs are not included in the official budget s.[46] In 2007, the Chinese Government announced a staggering increase of almost 17.8% of its military budget[47], resulting in questions asked by the government of its neighbours, including Japan, of its necessity and intentions.

Relying mostly in on a naval presence for maintaining its military position, and given the circumstance that China is particularly backward in this arm category, China’s challenge looks relatively comfortable despite alarmist US media and public opinion polls, and despite China’s ability to make sustaining US supremacy more costly and/or more difficult in the meantime.[48]

The US may consider the Chinese navy still far away from becoming a blue-ocean navy, but for Japanese policy makers China’s predominantly coastal navy is rather close to Japanese waters, as we have seen in the context of the disputes over the Senkaku Islands and the EEZ.[49] Japan-China Territorial Disputes: The Senkaku Islands

The Senkaku Islands territorial disputes is one of the most pressing and potentially destabilizing territorial disputes on Japan’s Horizon, however, involves five small islands and three “Rocky outcroppings”. The islands, which the Japanese call the Senkaku and the Chinese the Diaoyu, lie roughly 100 miles Northeast of Taiwan and approximately 250 miles west of Japan’s southernmost prefecture, Okinawa. The largest of these uninhabited islands covers approximately 20 acres, and has the potential to bring the two former combatants into open hostilities once more.

The fate of the islands has become a rallying point for Japanese and Chinese nationalists alike. In the summer of 1996, members of the nationalists Japan Youth Association erected aluminium, solar-powered lighthouse that measured about 15 feet tall and petitioned Japan’s Coast Guard to designate the beacon an official navigational signal and thereby reinforce Japan’s claims of sovereignty. The Coast Guard has yet to accede to this request. The lighthouse incident led to protests in Taiwan and Hong Kong, some of which involved as many as 10,000 angry Chinese demanding satisfactions for this affront to China’s sovereignty.

The Japanese are quick to point out that China never showed any particular interest in the disposition of the Senkaku Islands until a 1968 United Nations report suggested that there might be large petroleum deposits under the East China Sea in the vicinity of the Senkaku. In fact, the Chinese did not object to Japan’s 1895 assumption of sovereignty over the islands, nor did it voice any concerns regarding the islands status under Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. As it relates to the Senkaku Islands, Article III says the following: “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under the trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees North Latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands”.[50]

To further bolster their claim, the Japanese aversion that the United States considers the Senkaku Islands to be Japanese territory and will defend Japan’s claim should they be threatened or attacked. Tokyo is confident that should the dispute over ownership of the Senkaku Islands degenerate into a clash of arms, the United States is bound under Article 5 of the U.S-Japan Security Treaty to defend Japan’s interests.

Japan’s move towards China has always emphasized on economic action. The following quote of an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very revealing about Japan’s emphasis on economic enmeshment, as well as of the widespread misperception in Japan about the true complex nature of Japan’s engagement:

There are differences in approach between the US and Japan with regard to China policy. When we talk about ‘engagement’. If China misbehaves, then we have no option but containment, but we would like to keep it discreet. [51]

The focus on economic means to influence rather than changing China also contributes to another US-Japan difference. As Sato Hideo points out:

The more leaders are inclined to believe in the ultimately salutary effect of economic development on political stability and international convergence, the more they are willing to take a long term perspective and gradualist approach on different Chinese behaviours and violations of international norms and be more accommodative. This seems to be the case with Japan and less so with the US.[52]

Wan Ming mentions in this context that Japan tends to pay more attention to its long-term aims with China than the US, which is guided more by issues like trade or human rights. [53]

Nakai Yoshifumi points out that Japan’s reaction to Taiwan’s democratization was rather cautious compared with the US’s warm embrace because for Tokyo it ‘destroyed the congenial spirit of cross-strait communications’.[54] He also sees Japan-US divergences about China’s allegations that conspirators are behind Taiwanese independence, the role of Japan outside its territory, and the deployment of TMD in Taiwan.[55] Russia

The last two decade saw moments of intense mistrust and mutual acrimony between Moscow and Tokyo, but it also witnessed moments of warm relations, in which some saw the promise of normalized relations. As in the earlier periods of the twentieth century, Japanese leaders, policy-makers, and analyst saw in Russia the embodiment of a potential strategic partner, but also a nation that was far from Japan psychologically, although it is geographically the closest neighbour[56]. The unresolved issues of World War II that have clouded Japan’s relations with its other neighbours in North-east Asia have been the bane of Japanese-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War. The Northern Territories not only represent lost territory for Tokyo, but in the minds of the most Japanese also a sense of having been victimized in a dastardly fashion by the Soviet Union. Although Russia is viewed much more benignly than the Soviet Union, the obstacle that this issue poses has been much more difficult to overcome than before.

The history of the acrimony between Japan and Russia takes back as the early twentieth century began with the Russo-Japanese war which ended in Japan’s victory. From a Japanese viewpoint, Japan has been under a Russian threat for many centuries. Political, economic and military friction has long prevailed in Russo-Japanese relations. From a Russian viewpoint, Japan is seen as an aggressive nation because of its annexation of Sakhalin after the defeat of the Russo-Japanese war and its continuous attempts to explore resources in the Far East. In the post Cold-War world, Japan continues to be regarded as a potential enemy in the Russian defense strategy.

Although Russia and Japan signed the Declaration of Cease-fire in 1956, they have not been able to conclude a peace treaty to date. Both nations are in an unprecedented legal status, they are neither at war nor at peace.

in 1976 a Soviet pilot flying a MIG fighter actually defected by landing his plane in Hokkaido[57]. In the late 1970s Soviet force levels on the disputed islands were increased and Soviet SS-20 missiles were redeployed to the Far East from Soviet territory in Europe.[58]By 1988 leaders and analysts in Japan began to rethink their views of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.[59]

Japan’s interest in Russia was more than just about goodwill diplomacy and economics. A big rationale for a rapprochement was the fluid international environment in Northeast Asia. Most remarkable in this regard was the disappearance almost overnight of the Soviet Union, which had posed the greatest security threat to Japan for the previous five decades. Russia was now a benign player in Northeast Asia that posed little direct threat. Japan-Russia Energy Relationship

As in many other mixed economies, the Japanese government has been increasingly concerned with the management of energy supply and demand in the volatile energy market. The energy development in the Russia Far East had been instrumental in helping diversify energy supplies and thus enhance energy security for Japan. It has been contributing to Japan’s efforts of diversifying its sources away from oil to natural gas. The development of Russian Far East natural gas faces many obstacles and risks. One of the biggest obstacles is the unresolved territorial dispute.

Where Japan once seemed to possess the carrots in the relationship, Russia now seems to have the upper hand economically, due to energy. Tokyo could once threaten to withhold economic assistance and investment if Moscow skirted the territorial issue. Japan-Russia Territorial Dispute: The Northern Territories

In still another ongoing territorial dispute, Russia and Japan have yet to resolve the ownership of the Northern Territories: four islands off the coast of the northernmost island of Hokkaido that the Soviet Union seized late in the summer of 1945. Namely, the four islands are Shikotan, Habomai, Etorofu, and Kunashiri island groups. The Official Japanese position remains that Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, illegally occupies the islands[60]. The inability of the two countries to reach a settlement has actually prevented Japan and Russia from signing a peace treaty. The two countries have, at least officially, been in a state of war since the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in the last week of World War II. In 2004 the Russians suggested that a peace treaty could be concluded after two of the four islands were returned to Japan, but Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro rejected this offer as contrary to a 1993 agreement (The “Irkutsk Statement”) that linked a peace treaty to the determination of title on all four islands. [61]

During the first half of 1998 two major events transpired that helped along the Japanese-Russian rapprochement. The first was an agreement signed in the first weeks of 1998 that allowed Japanese fishing boats to catch a quota of fish and shellfish in the water off the disputed islands, in exchange for cash and fishing equipment to be paid by the Hokkaido Fisheries Association. This was seen as a coup by many Japanese who felts that this could considerably strengthen the basis for resolving sovereignty over the disputed islands.[62] Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea was formed in August 1948 under President Syngman Rhee. South Korea was a virtual protectorate of the United States following the division of the two Koreas at the conclusion of World War II. On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched a surprise attack, starting the Korean War.[63] The Korean War developed into the first active fighting of the Cold War. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, essentially freezing the conflict. The armistice also established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)[64] between North and South Korea that remains the powder keg for Northeast Asian security. The Cold War was frozen in a state of suspended animation along the DMZ; even today, the two Koreas remain in a state of war.[65] US forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. South Korea had established close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.

Due to the legacies of Japanese colonial rule over Korea ending in 1945, relations between Japan and South Korea have been strained at best. When the anti Japanese President Rhee Syngman thrown from his presidential seat in 1960, the normalization between Japan and South Korea had its first chance to develop. After agreeing to re initiate talks in the early 1960s, the two countries signed the Korea-Japan Basic Treaty in 1965.

Japan seemed to make a breakthrough in its relations with South Korea in October 1998, during an October 1998 visit to Tokyo by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, when the late Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi gave Japan’s first written apology for its past aggression.[66] Since that time, however, a number of incidents have kept Japan-South Korean relations on edge, including a visit to the Yasukuni War Memorial by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in August 2002. [67] South Korea as a Virtual Ally for Japan

Despite geographical proximity[68] that requires only two hours for flights from Tokyo to Seoul, Korean often argues that Japan is a geographically near but emotionally distant country. Recent developments in Korea-Japan relations show that even as relations have improved through “kanryu”[69] in Japan, bilateral ties can be shattered at any time by any move that is deemed provocative. When Shimane prefecture declared Takeshima Day on March 17, 2005[70], relations were frozen abruptly. Though overall ties may be characterized as alignment despite antagonism as Victor Cha notes, antagonism despite alignment can arise. [71] How to deal with Korea, which for decades have served as a virtual ally strategically yet retains historical animosity against Japan, has been a critical concern for Japanese strategic thinking.

Japanese strategic thinking toward the Korean Peninsula fits into a larger geostrategic context. First, there exists a long standing search for strategic balance between the United States and Asia. These strategic moves affected Japanese strategic thinking toward Korea in a profound way. Second, Japanese strategic thinking cannot be properly grasped without considering conflict and cooperation between South and North Korea on the peninsula. In the Cold War era, Japan’s strategy focussed mostly on making friendly ties with South Korea while antagonizing North Korea in order to build a bulwark against communist expansion, but afterwards Japan had to design a strategy for the entire peninsula, including North Korea as a potential partner.

In the post-cold war period, North Korea has been a major factor in Japan’s strategy toward South Korea. Third, the domestic political context in Japan must be considered in order to out Japanese strategy towards Korea. The shared historical legacy in modern times often became the cause of politically contentious issues. Japan’s political context, especially the relative weight of conservatives and liberals, contributed much to shaping a distinct style of strategic thinking toward Korea. Japan-South Korea Territorial Dispute: The Takeshima/Dokdo Islets

Both Japan and the Republic of Korea claim islets known, respectively to the two countries as the Takeshima and the Dokdo.[72] The islets, which boast a manned lighthouse and a docking facility, lie roughly equidistant between the two countries in the Sea of Japan and have been physically occupied by elements of the South Korean Coast Guard since 1954. The South Korean cite documents from as early as the sixth century to reinforce their claim to the islets, while Japan can only document its claim to 1905, when the territory was incorporated into Japan’s Shimane Prefecture-just five years before Japan annexed the entirety of the Korean Peninsula.[73]

As is the case with perhaps most of the territorial disputes in Northeast and Southeast Asia, there is more at issue than simply who plants their flag on an island: often times ownership of oil, natural gas field, and other potentially exploitable resources are at stake. The Takeshima/Dokdo controversy is no exception, although the passion behind the rival claims seems much more nationalistic than commercial. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established in 1948 under Kim Il-Sung. In 1949, Kim Il Sung was appointed the first premier of the Korean Workers’s Party, the de-facto head of the communist regime. He rules North Korea with an iron fist until his death in 1994 by promoting himself as the “Great Leader” of the Korean people[74]. Throughout the Cold War, Chairman Kim deftly switched camps between the Soviet Union and China depending on which relationship would provide the most benefit to North Korea[75]. In 1996, President Kim announced that North Korea would follow a new independent party line,. This policy stressed “complete equality, sovereignty, mutual respect, and non-interference among the communist worker parties.”[76] The independent party line evolved into North Korea’s juche [77] policy. The four principles of Juche are: [78]

Ideological autonomy.
Independence in politics
Economic self-sufficiency
Self reliance in defense

Although North Korea faces serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country always maintain and enhance its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. Starting in the late 1960’s, North Korea began to emphasize the importance of the military. North Korea embarked on an ambitious military-building program to the detriment of its economy due to loss of economic aid from other communist block members. North Korea remained diplomatically isolated up until the end of the Cold War. North Korea maintained relations only with the Soviet Union and China. North Korea also pursued an anti-American foreign policy.[79]

In September 1980, North Korea announced a new policy line, building a “Great and Prosperous Nation.” the policy objectives included: (1) a strong nation in politics and ideology; (2) a strong nation in the military; and (3) a strong nation in the economy.[80]

In 1991, a series of talks were held between the respective Prime Ministers of South Korea and North Korea to try to resolve the tensions between the two countries. This resulted in a joint declaration of “Non-aggression and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” however: these overtures were quickly overcome by North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty in 1993. Kim Il Sung’s death in July 1994 renewed hopes for peaceful resolution of the Korean issues.[81]

Specifically, North Korea poses a multidimensional threat to Japan. These dimensions include the DPRK’s deployment of medium-range missiles, its nuclear weapon programme, the intrusion of North Korean spy ships into Tokyo’s territorial waters, and Pyongyang’s abduction of Japanese nationals. The North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missile Issue

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have been issues of serious concern in Japan. The Japanese government has stated that the issue has a deep influence on Japan’s national security and also a critical problem for the entire international community. North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but it did not conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby creating a very strong suspicion from 1989 on that Pyongyang might have extracted sufficient amounts of weapons-grade plutonium to produce a few nuclear bombs.

On October 24, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the “Agreed Framework” which was designed to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program. The agreement had the following provisions:[82]

North Korea would shut down its graphite-moderated reactors and submit to IAEA inspection in exchange for US-provided light-water reactors by 2003. the United States agreed to provide 500,000 tons of heavy-oil as an alternative fuel source until the light-water reactors were operational.
The DPRK and the United States agreed to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
The DPRK and the United States would work for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
The DPRK would work to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In 1998, North Korea launched a Taepodong missile well over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean. Pyongyang claimed it was launching a satellite in space to broadcast revolutionary songs in honour of Kim Ils Sung and Kim Jong Il. This occurred only shortly after the intelligence reports revealed what could possibly be an underground nuclear weapons complex in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

In August 1998, North Korea launch of a medium-range Taepo dong I ballistic missile, with a potential range of about 2,000 to 2,200 kilometers, which then created a new level of concern about both the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. [83] The missile passed over the northern part of the main Japanese island of Honsu before the second stage splashed down in the Pacific Ocean. A third stage, which is thought to have carried a small satellite, failed to achieve its objective.[84]

It was until 2001 when the status of North Korea for the United States and its allies took a turn for the worse; the Bush administration took a hard-line approach toward North Korea. The Bush administration considered North Korea a “rogue regime,” and President Bush announced that North Korea was a member of the “Axis of Evil” during his January 2002 state of the Union address.[85] In October 2002 representatives of North Korea, when challenged by the United States Assistant Secretary of States James Kelly, admitted that North Korea was operating a covert uranium-based nuclear weapons programme. [86] The North Korean admission started a diplomatic stand-off among the major nations of Northeast Asia over how to deal with North Korea. The United States declared that North Korea was in violation of the Agreed Framework and suspended oil shipments to North Korea.[87] The North Koreans responded by expelling the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, restarting their graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon, and withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty.

The number of No-dongs fielded by the DPRK increased slowly between October 2002 and December 2003. North Korea also refrained from launching another Taepo-dong: the DPRK continued to maintain the letter, though not the spirit, of its self-imposed testing moratorium.[88]

What changed since October 2002 was the political elites and the public in Japan joined government officials in recognizing the danger posed by North Korea’s missile build-up. The technical specifications of the No-dong render Japan the missile’s only viable target. With a range of 1,000 kilometres, the No-dong would over fly South Korea. China and the Russian Far East are unlikely targets, and the missile cannot reach the United States.[89] Nevertheless, prior to October 2002, Japanese politicians and the general populace overlooked the hostile intentions communicated by North Korea’s medium range missiles.[90]

North Korea’s move to reprocess used plutonium represented a pressing threat. The 8,000 spent fuel rods stored in Yongbyong constituted an “overnight” nuclear capability. After reprocessing, they provided enough plutonium to construct five nuclear weapons within a year.[91] Furthermore, by June 2003, Pyongyang reportedly overcame the warhead.[92] In February of 2005, North Korea publicly announced it possessed nuclear weapons[93] and ended its moratorium on missile testing a month later.

The Six-Party Talks[94] have been held since August 2003 in pursuit of a peaceful solution to this problem and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time, which stated the verifiable abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. Subsequently, however, North Korea strongly reacted to the United States’ designation of a bank in Macao dealing with North Korea as a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern,” suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks, and, in 2006, launched seven ballistic missiles and announced that it had implemented a nuclear test. Against these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea. Finally, in December 2006, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and, in February 2007, the parties reached an agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” to implement the joint statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, after the initial actions including shutting down of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon had been implemented, in October 2007, the “Second-phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” were announced as the outcome of the sixth round of the Talks. The agreement includes completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and a “complete and correct declaration of North Korea’s nuclear programs” by the end of 2007. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed. In the meantime, in response to North Korea’s missile launch of April 5, 2009, the U.N Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning North Korea’s launch, which is in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718, and demanding that North Korea not conduct any further launch. North Korea then announced that it would take strong steps unless Security Council apologizes including boycotting the six-party talks, restarting the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rod, in addition to nuclear tests and launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles as self-defense measures, and that the second nuclear test was conducted on 25 may 2009. on the 13th of June, the international community adopted UN security Council resolution 1874, condemning North Korea’s nuclear test in the strongest term and, imposing additional measures against North Korea. In response to the UNSC resolution, North Korea announced that the whole amount of the newly extracted plutonium would be weaponized, and the process of uranium enrichment would be commenced.

In the area of Ballistic Missiles, it is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed various kinds of ballistic missiles, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries, North Korea is considered to have begun developing longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, such as Nodong, and it is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. in 1998, North Korea used a ballistic missile based on Taepodong-1 in the launch over Japan. In the 2006 launch, which constituted a complete lifting of the freeze on ballistic missile launches announced by North Korea in 1999, North Korea fired seven ballistic missiles in total, the third which was assessed to have been Taepodong-2 and others to be Scud and Nodong Missiles. North Korea is an extremely closed regime, and many of details of its ballistic missiles are still unclear. It, however, appears that North Korea gives high priority to ballistic missiles in terms of political and diplomatic considerations. The North Korean Spy Ship Infiltration Issue

The acrimony between Japan and North Korea also resulted from North Korea’s spy ship infiltration. From 1999 on, North Korean spy ships repeatedly infiltrated Japanese waters.[95] These maritime intrusions cast the DPRK as a tangible security threat. In particular, the display of a salvaged North Korean vessel sunk by the Japanese Coast Guard in 2001 added to the public’s growing sense of anxiety. When exhibited in early 2003, the spy ship display attracted 20,000 visitors its first weekend[96]. The vessel’s armament such as rocket launchers, machine guns, an anti aircraft gun, and two anti aircraft missile launchers-shocked the Japanese public.[97] Although not a main impetus behind missile defence, it can be concluded that the spy ship intrusions by North Korea contributed to the popular belief in Japan that Pyongyang constituted an erratic, menacing regime. The Kidnapping of Japanese Citizen by North Korean Agent

The Problem Japan is facing with North Korea also is related to North Korea’s alleged attempt to kidnap Japanese citizens. Kim Jong Il’s admission that his country had kidnapped Japanese citizens provoked a wave of anger against North Korea.[98] Rather than subsiding, antipathy for the DPRK actually deepened as more information emerged about the abductions. Of the thirteen Japanese nationals kidnapped by North Korean agents, eight died under mysterious circumstances.-gas poisoning, auto mobile crashes, drowning, heart attacks, and suicide. Adding to popular suspicions, all abductees have death certificates from the same hospital, although they allegedly perished in different locations.[99] After the abduction issue came to light, public outrage prevented even representatives of the Japanese Communist Party from participating in this annual rite.[100]

Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro blatantly manipulated the abductions to exploit the public’s North Korea-phobia. At times, Ishihara’s statements verged on demagoguery:

“We are under threat ourselves from another terrorist state, North Korea, which has kidnapped 150 of our citizens. 150 people! I don’t think any of them are alive. Pyongyang is also sending boatloads of drugs to Japan to harm our youngsters, and it has missiles ready to hit 15 Japanese cities…. this is the country that says it is ready to deliver a “sea of fire” over Japan.”[101]

As a result, North Korea’s growing arsenal of missiles, nuclear programme, and spy boat intrusions became more than just an existential danger. In light of the abductions, the Japanese public perceived North Korean capabilities as a tangible security threat.

2.4.2 Non-Traditional Threat

As it has been described in the first chapter, the changing nature of the world structure has also resulted in new threats that emerged in the multipolar world. Japan has also been threatened by these non-traditional threats, the next part of this chapter will further explains those threat to Japan’s security environment. Terrorism

The September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States had a profound impact on the Japanese. The fact that the most powerful nation on the planet was attacked on its own soil forced the Japanese to realize that they themselves were also vulnerable.[102]

The Government of Japan’s concern of the terrorist issue finds a mention in the 2008 Diplomatic Blue Book, which stated that:

“Japan considers counter terrorism as its own security issue. Making use of a broad range of approaches, such as providing assistance to other countries and strengthening international legal frameworks, Japan will continue to actively strengthen its counter-terrorism efforts in cooperation with the international community.” The Aum Shinrikyo Cult

The idea that innocents could be killed for twisted political or religious gains is not new to the Japanese, having already suffered the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s attacks on Japan’s soil. Aum Shinrikyo, which is on recent times also known as Aum and Aleph, is a Japanese cult that combines tenets from Buddhism, Hinduism, and is obsessed with the apocalypse.[103] the group is founded by Shoko Asahara in 1984, starting off as a Yoga and meditation class known as Aum-no-Kai (“Aum club”) and steadily grew in the following years. It gained the official status as a religious organization in 1989.[104]

The group made headlines around the world in 1995 when members carried out a chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system. A nerve agent, Sarin, was released onto train cars, killing twelve person and causing an estimated six thousand people to seek medical attention.[105]

Up until this recent years, the cult under its new name, Aleph, still conduct numerous activities such as soliciting donations, collecting tithes, selling materials to members, holding seminars, conducting training, and selling computers. Active recruiting is under way. The cult itself has offices throughout Japan, around Tokyo and other cities, and still maintain 100 hide-outs throughout that country as “safe-houses”. [106] The Al Qaeda Terrorist Network Activities in Japan

Al Qaeda[107] has been the centre of attention in the global terrorist movement, especially after its alleged attack on the United State’s soil. by June 2004, Japanese authorities had arrested eight people suspected of having ties to al Qaeda including:

l Shiddiqur Rahman, a 37 year old Bangladeshi residing in Japan on a fake passport. When he was arrested he had several prepaid phone cards, which he likely got from Islam Mohammed Himu.[108]

l Islam Mohamed Himu, a 33 year old Bangladeshi who ran a prepaid cell phone sales company; known to have had frequent contact with Lionel Dumont, a suspected member of Al Qaeda who was arrested in Germany in December 2003.[109]

l Lionel Dumont, a 33-year-old French convert to Islam with reputed ties to Al-Qaeda lived periodically in Japan during 2002 and 2003. In that time, he reportedly made more than 40 banks deposits and withdrawals.[110]

The threat of Islamist terrorism to which Tokyo was responding was not a theoretical one. In 2003, in a message attributed to Osama bin Laden, Japan was among a handful of nations specifically identified as legitimate targets of Islamist retaliation because of their support of American efforts in Iraq.[111] When hiding in Tora Bora Mountains of Eastern Afghanistan, the Al Qaeda leader has been quoted of saying:

Japan can’t stand any attack against its interests. We could destroy Japan’s economy. We could attack tankers headed to Japan[112] International Organized Crime

Human trafficking, drug related crime, cyber crime, money laundering, Piracy, and other cross-border organized crimes are escalating further as a result of globalization, the sophistication of communications networks, and an expansion in the movements of people.

One of the most obvious example of the crucial problem Japan is facing is with the security problem in the Sea of Japan, which flows north-east through the sea, modifying the climate of the region, including Vladivostok, the only ice-free port of eastern Russia.[113] Despite its significance for both global maritime commerce and also Japan’s own interest, this area has so much potential to become unstable due to problems including piracy and armed robbery.[114] Japan is a sea girt country, and the security of the sea lane is proposition of supremacy in it for the country that imports most of resources such as food and oil via sea.[115]

2.5 Japan’s Threat Perception

Security is a very scarce value that every nation should achieve. Especially for Japan, where its position in a very volatile region, and also in a period where every key players in the region is predicting each other’s political movement. To every nation, security is a very crucial matter in order to keep the well being of a nation. Every nation will use any possible way to eliminate any threat to its security. Richard Ullman, argued that the meaning of security threat is: [116]

‘…a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the equality of life for the inhabitans of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices avalaible to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state’.

In examining more of the issue discussed in this chapter, theory of threat perception is needed to further explain Japan’s perceived security environment. Threat perception can be described as a complex process and not easily defined. It is a process that separate signal and reaction and incorporates the elements of perception and judgement. The process influenced by a number factors, which may be grouped under the heading “predispositional”[117]

As it has been said in the first chapter, Robert O. Tilman argued that there are five determining factors that influenced threat perceptions. In the below, the researcher will try to elaborate key players in the region with structural, geopolitical, historical, socio cultural, and economic dimensions.

Table 3.1. Japan’s Threat Perceptions











North Korea





South Korea






2.5.1 Structural Dimension

The first subject of the threat dimension that we will discuss is the structural dimension, which refers to the type of political system, regime structure, and also the ideology of the other nations that has been perceived as a subject of threat. If we look at China, where nationalism has always been a strong element of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and opposing Japanese imperialism is at the core of this nationalist story. As a result, Chinese citizens have been fed a steady diet of patriotic, anti-Japanese media programming designed to glorify the CCP’s role in World War II. Although far removed from that era, most Chinese young people hold an intense and unapologetically negative view of both Japan and, in many cases, its people. Japanese encroachment on Chinese territory as well as the wounds inflicted on Chinese national pride by Japanese attitudes of superiority provoked a powerful nationalist backlash among the Chinese population. One of the cathartic moments in the formation of the modern Chinese sense of national identity, the May Fourth Movement of 1919, was triggered by popular outrage over the Chinese governments acceptance of Japanese territorial demands after World War I.[118] Chinese national identity defined itself in opposition to Japan. At the same time the domestic situation in China is also cited as an argument about the Chinese threat. China is either an authoritarian state or a state shifting slowly from authoritarianism to democracy[119]. The domestic political conditions are such that the competitors for leadership in China usually adopt aggressive foreign policies that would garner popular support with nationalist sentiments on the one hand, and elite support from the institutional remnants of authoritarian rule, especially the military, on the other.[120]

While for South Korea, although ostensibly aligned with Japan through its security relationship with the United States, South Korean elite and popular sentiment was overwhelmingly coloured by a powerful anti-Japanese feeling. In a very real way modern Korean nationalism had been forged in the crucible of Japanese colonial domination of Korea, and many of the new ROK’s most revered s were former leaders of the anti colonial movement. Japan’s continued mistreatment of the resident Korean population, as well as remarks by senior Japanese government officials that reflected a continuation of condescending attitudes toward Korea, did little to change both grass roots and elite anti-Japanese animosity in South Korea.[121]

In Korea, the symbols of the new republic drew actively on anti-Japanese symbols. For instance, a national monument was erected in honour of An Jungkun, the Korean assassin of the first Japanese consul general of Korea, Ito Hirobumi, and his image was widely used in Korean currency. The import of Japanese cultural products, including music and theatre, was outlawed, despite a large potential audience for such goods. Japanese-Korean diplomatic relations were hampered by deeply rooted feelings of mutual antipathy and bitter recriminations. Reflecting the mood, Japan responded to the Korean outcry to apologize over newly discovered comfort women issues. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono made a sincere apology to the comfort women in 1992, and Prime Minister Miyazawa also confirmed this stance.

Together with North Korea, Soviet Russia formed the ‘world socialist community’ and a bulwark against ‘American imperialism and Japanese militarism’.

It can be concluded, that in the structural dimension, all China, North Korea , South Korea, and Russia had a significant elements that poses as a threat to Japan.

2.5.2 Geopolitical Dimension

The Second sets of Threat dimension can be assessed through the geopolitical system, which refers to one countries size and geographical relations. China, its size, and its geographical location have always been regarded by Japanese policymakers, especially in the defence sector as very crucial elements when assuming and assessing China’s relevancies as a threat to Japan. Frictions about the Senkaku islands, and many other territorial disputes is a prove of how Japan’s geographic contiguity with China can be considered as a very important matter.

While for the Korean Peninsula, which has been an area of major concern for Japan since the 19th century. Its importance can be seen from the fact that Japan fought wars with China and Russia in the past over the control of the Korean Peninsula. By defeating the two major powers and colonizing Korea, Japan could improve its security and strengthen its military and economic prowess. Yet its war against the allied forces, led by the United States during World War II, devastated Japan and resulted in the loss of its control over Korea. Japan’s defeat in the war led to the division of Korea by the Soviet Union and the United States, which was formalized by the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPROK). The partition of Korea into communist and capitalist states and their confrontation became a major security concern for Japan and has strongly affected Japan’s political and economic development. By looking to its geographical proximity with Japan, both countries resided in the Korean Peninsula has always regarded to be extremely important, and any changes in the Peninsula always has will be a major concern for Japan’s policymakers.

First, there exists a long standing search for strategic balance between the United States and Asia. These strategic moves affected Japanese strategic thinking toward Korea in a profound way. Second, Japanese strategic thinking cannot be properly grasped without considering conflict and cooperation between South and North Korea on the peninsula.

In dealing with Russia, its closest neighbour in terms of geographical proximity, Japan has a profound territorial dispute with Russia on four islands, which is the Shikotan, Habomai, Etorofu, and Kunashiri island groups[122]. The geographical proximity between Japan and Russia also determined the frequency of frictions between the two countries. As we can see in the incidents of “Fishing Wars” between their oceans in the past era, where Japan’s fishing boats are held and detained due to misunderstandings in sea border interpretations. There are also a profound suspicion about Russia’s search for warm-water ports, something that has been going as a recurring theme in Russian foreign policy. Since, although its territory was spread over one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, Russia did not have adequate access to the sea, and such land-locked geographic nature constantly prompted her to advance in the direction of warm water ports and open seas.

2.5.3 Historical Dimensions

Michael D Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis pointed out that China’s history memory of past greatness and the desire to restore previous eminence: its determination to erase the painful legacy of a century of national humiliation; its desire to recreate the traditional sino-centric world order as a means of regulating political and economic structures of super-ordination and subordination; its belief that China’s external security in the past was primarily assured by a strong state able to dominate or at the very least neutralize the strategic periphery; and so on.[123]

Meanwhile, historical mistrust which mainly caused by Japan’s occupation of several countries in the past has hardened relationship between Japan and the two Koreas. For instance, Japan and Korea have had a particularly troubled relationship in modern times. As Japan developed into a Great Power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century it sought to catch up with the Great Western Powers by carving out an imperial sphere if its own.[124] Korea became the first target of Japanese expansionism, and eventually was annexed by Japan in 1910. Opposition to Japanese rule was squelched with brutal efficiency, and the economic strategists needs of the Japanese home islands, rather than the interests of the Korean population, dictated the course of Korean economic and social development.[125]

The memory of Japanese aggression before 1945 continues to weigh heavily on its relation with the rest of Asia, in particular on its relation with the Two Koreas. The widespread perception that Japan has no sense of remorse for its past actions, feeds suspicions that it easily could revert to its earlier, more belligerent patterns of behaviour.

In the context of Russia, inevitably in seeing the historical dimension one can’t avoid looking to the Russo-Japanese War, which taken place in 1904-1905. the war broke out when Japan’s call on Russia to withdraw its far eastern armies stationed in Manchuria and demands for Russia’s recognition of Japan’s paramount interest in Korea failed to be abide by the Russian side. In the war Japan was victorious and gained the dominant position in Korea and southern Manchuria.

2.5.4 Socio-cultural Dimensions

In the Social-cultural dimension, we will assess how China, North Korea, and Russia’s social-cultural posture acts as a determining factor for Japan’s relationship with both countries. China and North Korea’s social cultural characteristics, which can be regarded as a pluralistic community, where dictatorship and non democratic society presents enlargement for any possibilities for antagonistic views toward Japan by the people of both countries. While for Russia, on the other hands, although it has been regarded to be economically more liberal in recent years, but Russia still can be regarded as a country which has a dominant in its decision making process.

2.5.5 Economic Dimensions

On the Economic dimension, Japan’s perspectives on China’s economy tend to separate into two extremes-one camp views China’s growing foreign economic presence as a threat, while the other camp questions China’s ability to sustain growth due to structural impediments.[126] Moreover, China overtook Japan in market share in the US import market. These trends, along with related concerns about Japan’s deindustrialization, have heightened the perception of China as a threat to Japan.[127]

North Korea

North Korea has been facing chronic economic stagnation and energy-food shortages in recent years as a result of a number of factors including fragility of its socialistic planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries.

While from Russia, Japan’s biggest challenge and concerns is the dependence of Japan to Russia’s energy resources. Japan’s dependent of Russia’s pacific energy resources could put Japan’s in a difficult position, where Russia now holds a key to Japan’s energy resources.

2.6 China and North Korea as a Threat to Japan

If we look at the threat factors described above, China an North Korea emerges as the most significant threat to Japan’s security. This is coherent with the Japanese government view, in which the 2005 National Defense Program Guideline of Japan was widely reported to have designated China and North Korea as a threat.

“China, which has a strong influence on the security in this region, has been modernizing its nuclear and missile capabilities as well as naval and air forces, and expanding its area of operations at sea. We have to remain attentive to its future course. In this context, close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-US Security Arrangements, continues to play a key role for the security of Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”[128]

“While for North Korea, military moves, such as the deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, are a serious destabilizing factor in the security of the region.”[129]

The neo realists perspective of power structure is coherent with the notion that China is a growing threat for Japan in the region. According to the power structure perspective, when any state becomes wealthier and more powerful, it will inevitably seek greater regional and then world-wide political influence, which will cause the change of the power-structure in the region and in the world. Needless to say, China is a rising power in the East Asia region and to some extent in the world from the end of the last century to the beginning of the 21st century.

The then foreign minister of Japan Taro Aso stated in a press conference in 2005:

“China is a neighbour with one billion people equipped with nuclear bombs and has expanded its military outlays by double digits for 17 years in a row and it is unclear as to what this is being used for. It is beginning to be a considerable threat.”[130]

While in defining North Korea as a threat to Japan, Aso stated in 2006 that:

“If North Korea did carry out a nuclear test as it claims, this act represents the spread of a new nuclear threat, not only to Northeast Asia but to the entire international community. It is no less than an enormous threat to peace and security, a major threat and challenge to non-proliferation.”[131]

[1]As in Japanese, the actual word is Nippon Koku, cited from https://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+jp0004) accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[2]Cited from Japan: Geography. Available from https://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+jp0005) accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[3]A political system in which the head of state is a king or queen ruling to the extent allowed by a constitution. Cited from https://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861688242/constitutional_monarchy.html accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[4]The National Diet of Japan is the name used in English to refer to the national parliament of Japan, as a translation of the Japanese name Kokkai. The Diet was created under Meiji Constitution. The Diet was partly modeled on the Imperial German Reichstag, and partly on the British Parliament. Cited from https://www.japan-101.com/government/national_diet__japan_government.htm accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[5]Cited from Japan: Government and Politics, Available from https://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+jp0009) accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[6]Cited from Christopher W. Hughes, Why Japan Could Revise its Constitution and What it Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy, University of Warwick institutional, Available at https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1051/1/WRAP_Hughes_9871481-080709-hughes_why_japan_could_revise_its_constitution_wrap.pdf accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB



[9]Cited from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm# accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[10]Daniel M Kliman, Op Cit p 28

[11]Cited from 64 Years after Hiroshima Japan Upholds Three Non-Nuclear Principles https://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=106539 accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[12]Ibid, p 29

[13]Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I Okimoto, The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia, Asia Pacific Research Center, Washington DC, 2004, p103

[14]Cited from Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports, available from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html accessed on the 29th of September 2009, at 23.30 WIB

[15] The Commision on America’s National Interests, op.cit., p 5-8

[16]Daniel M Kliman, 2006. Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post 9/11World :Embracing a New Realpolitik.Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC p 44

[17]Yoshii Nogami and Ralph A Cossa. Japan-US Security Relations: A Testing time for the Alliance, available at https://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_v09n14.pdf accessed on the 29th of September 2009, at 23.30 WIB

[18]Kimiko Kishikawa, The Realignment of the Japan-United States Alliance and the Emerging Roles and Missions of the Japan Self Defense Force. US. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2004. Available at http//handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA424241 accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[19] Cited from Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi , available at accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[20] Cited from Japan’s Diplomacy: Ensuring Security and Prosperity, Speech by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Prime Minister of Japan. Available at accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[21] Cited from Central Asia as a Corridor of Peace and Stability, Speech by Mr Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Japan National Press Club. Available at accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[22] Cited from Japan’s Diplomacy: Ensuring Security and Prosperity, Speech by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Prime Minister of Japan. Available at accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[23] Cited from Japan’s Grand Strategy in the 21st century, speech at JICC on January 27,2005 by Nobukatsu Kanehara, Political Minister of Japan. Available at https://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/embassy/otherstaff_Kanehara.htm accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[24] Cited from Japan’s Grand Strategy in the 21st century, speech at JICC on January 27,2005 by Nobukatsu Kanehara, Political Minister of Japan. Available at https://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/embassy/otherstaff_Kanehara.htm accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[25] Cited from Speech by Mr Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar “Arc of Freedom and Porsperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons” Available at accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[26] Cited from The Hallmarks of Economic Diplomacy for Japan, Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso at the Japan National Press Club. Available at accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[27] Cited from Trade Policy Reviews: Japan. Available at accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[28] Ibid

[29] Cited from Speech by Mr Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institue of International Affairs Seminar “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s expanding Diplomatic Horizons”. Available at accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[30] Cited from Objectives and Priorities of Japan’s Foreign Policy. Japan’s Diplomatic Blue Book 1992. Available at,+peace+and+human+rights&cd=2&hl=id&ct=clnk&gl=id accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[31] Cited from The 1992 Japan’s Diplomatic Blue Book. Available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/other/bluebook/1992/1992-2-3.htm accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[32] Cited from Promotion of Mutual Understanding and Cultural exchange with Foreign Countries. Available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1980/1980-3-4.htm https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1980/1980-3-4.htm

[33]Cited from Japan’s Geography, Japan-Guide.com available at https://www.japan-guide.com/list/e1000.html accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[34]Cited from East Asia, definition of East Asian at dictionary.com, available at https://dictionary.reference.com/browse/East+Asian accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[35]This is available from The Cabinet Office. https://www.cao.go.jp/index-e.html accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[36] It is reported that there are 55 ethic minorities living in China, besides the Han Chinese ethnic group.

[37]The Yasukuni war shrine is seen by China as a symbol of Japan’s World War II militarism. The government of China had voiced their anger at the visit, which they said would further strain relations. Yasukuni honours Japan’s 2.5 million war dead, including 14 convicted as criminals by a 1948 war tribunal, a brief explanation of the Shrine is available at https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1330223.stm accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[38]The problem of the history school emerged when in 2005 the Japanese government issued a history school book which many Chinese historians in Beijing describes as “placing emphasis on pride of the nation, service to the nation and the obligation of national defence by glorifying war and distorting historic facts”, many Chinese historian also viewed the book as a notion that the Japanese government are upholding Japanese monarchy and claimed that the Japanese are superior to other Asians. Cited from Qin Jize, Experts slam Japan’s incendiary School Book. Available at https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/07/content_431948.htm accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[39]The Nanking Massacre refers to a six-week period following the Japanese capture of Nanking, then capital of the Republic of China, on December 9, 1937. Numbers estimates that hundreds of thousands of civilians were murdered and 20,000-80,000 women were raped by soldiers of the imperial Japanese Army. Many Japanese historians and politician denied the massacre and said that it was fabricated by the Chinese government; this has been one of the stumbling blocks of the Japan-China relations until now. For more information of the Nanking Massacre, see Basic Facts on the Nanking Massacre and the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, available at https://www.cnd.org/mirror/nanjing/NMNJ.html accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[40]The Comfort Women issue is an allegation for the women forced to work as sex slaves for the Japanese imperial army. The Japanese government has been conducting efforts on managing this issue by offering compensations. Cited from https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6530197.stm accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[41]Wu Xinbo, U.S Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-US Relations, September 2000, available at https://www.brookings.edu/papers/2000/09northeastasia_xinbo.aspx accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[42]Reinhard Drifte, 2003. Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989, London: Routledge Curzon p 39

[43]On 16 October 1964 China joined the nuclear club by conducting its initial atomic test at Lop Nor, in Western China. This was the prelude to a series of increasingly sophisticated test shots. Cited from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/prc64.htm accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[44]John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse. Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, London: Athlone Press, 1988, pp.190-1,196,199.

[45]Shiro Saitoh, op.cit., p. 16.

[46]Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2006, Chapter 1 Security Environment Surrounding Japan, p 29-30, Available at https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[47]Cited from https://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?xct=gd.e070307

[48] Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of Peace. East Asia in The 21st Century”, International Security, vol 23, no 4, spring 1999, pp 81-118

[49]Michael J. Green and Benjamin S. Self. “Japan’s Changing China Policy” Routledge, p 45

[50]Cited from Treaty of Peace with Japan, available at https://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[51]Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, Council on Foreign Relations Press 1999. P 270

[52]Hideo Sato, ‘Japan’s China Perceptions and Its Policies in the Alliance with the United States’. University of Tsukuba: 1998. p 17.

[53]Wan Ming, ‘Human Rights and US-Japan relations in Asia: Divergent Allies’ East Asia, Vol 16, no ¾, autumn/winter 1998 pp.137-168

[54]Nakai Yoshifumi, Policy Coordination in Taiwan, in Nishihara Masashi (ed)., The Japan-US alliance. New Challenges for the 21st Century., Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000,pp.80-1

[55]Nakai Yoshifumi, Policy Coordination on Taiwan, op.cit.,pp.87-8

[56]The actual distance from Tokyo, Japan, to Moscow, Russia is 7,501 kilometres or 4,661 Miles. Cited from https://www.convertunits.com/distance/from/Tokyo,+Japan/to/Moscow,+Russia accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[57]Cited from Mikoyan-gurevich Mig-25, available at https://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mikoyan-Gurevich_MiG-25 accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[58]Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1995, pp. 181-98

[59]Both Rozman and Hasegawa date the change thinking among Japanese to 1998. See Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute , pp. 285-898; Rozman, Japan’s Respone to the Gorbachev Era, p 112

[60]Cited from https://www.stormingmedia.us/92/9207/A920704.html accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[61]Cited from Japan and Russia still Searching for a Closure, https://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058753.html accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[62]Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, New York: Palgrave 2001, pp6,23-24

[63]For a complete explanation about the time line, and also a complete information of the war, see Korean War, https://www.korean-war.com/ accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[64]The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is an area of land encompassing 4 kilometers-wide strip of land straddling the 151 mile long Military Demarcation Line (MDL). The 27 July 1953 Armistice Agreement established the DMZ along the approximate line of ground contact between the opposing forces at the time the truce ended the Korean War. The opposing sides agreed under the Armistice agreement from entering the territory, air space or contiguous waters under control of the other. Even though North Korea committed violations at sea and in the air, and infiltrated armed agents along South Korea’s extensive coastline and outlying islands, it is and along the DMZ that most Armistice violations have occurred. Cited from Korean Demilitarized Zone, Global Security.org, available from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/dmz.htm accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[65]Cited from The Korean War, Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/322419/Korean-War accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[66]The full text of the speech by the Late Keizo Obuchi on the apology is available at https://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/souri/981204policy-speech.html accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[67]The Yasukuni war shrine is seen by Japan’s neighbours as a symbol of the country’s World War II militarism. Both China and South Korea voiced their anger at the visit, which they said would further strain relations. Yasukuni honours Japan’s 2.5 million war dead, including 14 convicted as criminals by a 1948 war tribunal, a brief explanation of the Shrine is available at https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1330223.stm accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[68]The Actual distance between Seoul, South Korea and Tokyo, Japan is 717.84 Miles or 1155.23 Kilometres, Distance between South Korea and Japan, available from https://www.mapcrow.info/Distance_between_Seoul_KS_and_Tokyo_JA.html accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[69]A Japanese term for “Korea Fever”, an article describing how the Korean Fever can help eliminate discrimination of the Korean people in Japan is available at https://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fd20040627pb.html accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[70]Takeshima is the Japanese name for an island in the Sea of Japan claimed by Japan and South Korea, Cited from Japanese Regional Assembly Snubs South Korea with “Takeshima Day” Bill, Encyclopaedia.com, available at https://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-130117445.html accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB

[71]Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. p 35

[72]For a complete explanation of the dispute, see The Historical Facts about the Takeshima-Dokdo Dispute, available at https://www.dokdo-takeshima.com/ accessed on the 21th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB


[74]Cited From North Korea: The World Fact book, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html accessed on the 20th of June,2009 at 23.30 WIB



[77]North Korean word for “Self Reliance”, the North Korean authorities emphasize that the core concept of Juche is “the ability to act independently without regard to outside interference.” The aforementioned description of Juche is available from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/juche.htm# accessed on the 24th of June 2009, at 23.30 WIB

[78]Cited From Encyclopaedia Britannica, North Korea, Encyclopaedia Britannica On-line. Http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?query=north%20korea&ct=eb&eu=114856&tocid=214597#214597.toc Accessed on the 23rd of June 2009, at 12.20 WIB


[80]Cited from Korea Research Institue for Strategy, 2001: The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia, Seoul:KRIS, 2001, p 273 available at https://www.kier.re.kr/open_content/eng/main_page.jsp accessed on the 12th of June, 2009 at 12.30 WIB


[82]Cited from Agreed Framework between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Governments of the United States and North Korea, Available from accessed on the 12th of June, 2009 at 12.30 WIB

[83] Cited from Richard P Cronin, The North Korean Nuclear Threat and the US-Japan Security Alliance: Perceived Interests, Approaches and Prospects, South East Asia Journal Vol 29:1 Winter 2005. available at https://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/pdf/Cronin_The_North_Korean_Nuclear_Threat_and%20the_US_Japan_Security_Alliance.pdf accessed on the 23rd of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[84] Ibid

[85]Cited from Bush’s “Evil Axis” Comment Stirs Critics, BBC News Online, available at https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1796034.stm accessed on the 23rd of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[86]Cited from Can North Korea be Stopped? National Interest Online, available at https://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20094 accessed on the 23rd of June 2009, at 24.00 WIB

[87]Cited from The North Korean Nuclear Situation:History of the ‘Agreed Framework and how it was Broken, About.com:US Government Info, available at https://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aankorea.htm accessed on the 23rd of June 2009, at 24.00 WIB

[88]North Korea threatened to lift the missile moratorium if Japan failed to move forward on normalizing bilateral relations. The DPRK also tested surface-to-ship missiles that fell below the range stipulated in the moratorium.

[89]Cited from Nuclear Threat Initiative,North Korea Profile: Missile Overview, August 2004, on https://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/index.html accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 20.00 WIB

[90]Cited from A North Korean Missile Test: Implications for the U.S and the Region, The Heritage Foundation, available at https://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/wm1134.cfm accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 21.00 WIB

[91]Cited from Jon B. Wolfsthal Estimates of North Korea’s Unchecked Nuclear Weapons Production Potential, working paper from Non-proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., July 2003, 2. available at https://www.carnegieendowment.org/zoomsearch/search.asp?zoom_query=jon&zoom_page=2&zoom_per_page=10&zoom_cat=-1&zoom_and=0&zoom_sort=0 accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 21.00 WIB

[92]Cited from U.S Told Japan that North Korea Has Several Nuclear Warheads, Agence France Presse, June 21, 2003 available at https://www.afp.com//afpcom/fr accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 21.00 WIB

[93]Cited from Timeline: N.Korea Nuclear Dispute. CNN Online www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/nkorea.timeline/index.html accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 21.00 WIB

[94] 7

[95]Cited from Japan Sinks ‘North Korea spying ship’, Telegraph.co.uk, available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/1366227/Japan-sinks-North-Korea-spying-ship.html accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 21.00 WIB


[97]Cited from Mark E. Manyin,Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues, CRS report for Congress RL32161, Washington D.C November 26,2003,11 available at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/27531.pdf accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 21.00 WIB

[98]Cited from The Japanese Citizen Abduction by North Korea, https://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abduction/index.html Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.23 WIB

[99]Cited from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abductions of Japanese Citizens by North Korea, n.d., https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/abduction.pdf. Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.23 WIB

[100]Cited from James Brooke North Korea Birthday Party in Japan Illustrates Strains, New York Times, September 9, 2003. available at https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/09/international/asia/15north.html?_r=1 Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.23 WIB

[101]Victor D. Cha,Containment Lite, Comparative Connections 5, no 2, April-June 2003,p 119-126

[102]Cited from 9-11 and Japan: How the Terrorist Threat is Affecting Tokyo’s Thinking, The Free Library by Farlex, Available at https://www.thefreelibrary.com/9-11+and+Japan:+how+the+terrorist+threat+is+affecting+Tokyo’s+thinking-a082005573 Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.30 WIB

[103]Cited from Aum Shinrikyo (Japan, Lutists, Aleph, Aum Supreme Truth) available from https://www.cfr.org/publication/9238/ Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.30 WIB

[104]Cited from Aleph, available from https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/jp%7Daum.html Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.30 WIB


[106]Cited from Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat? available from https://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no4/olson.htm Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.30 WIB

[107]Al Qaeda, which in Arabic means ‘The Base’, was originally the name that the CIA station chiefs in Saudi Arabia gave to the database that they created to keep track of the individuals and groups to which the US government was providing funds for the Afghani Mujahideen during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, later on the term “Al Qaeda” is closely regarded as the most mentioned and largely known terrorist group, the aforementioned definition is available at https://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/01-12-2008/106767-al_qaeda-0 Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.45 WIB

[108]Cited from 9-11 and Japan: How the Terrorist Threat is Affecting Tokyo’s Thinking, The Free Library by Farlex, Available at https://www.thefreelibrary.com/9-11+and+Japan:+how+the+terrorist+threat+is+affecting+Tokyo’s+thinking-a082005573 Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.30 WIB


[110]Cited from Japan Arrests five in Al-Qaeda linked Probe, Arab News, 27 May 2004, available at https://www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=45725&d=27&m=5&y=2004 Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.45 WIB

[111]Cited from Bin Laden Considered Targeting Japanese Economy, National Review Online, available at https://media.nationalreview.com/post/?q=YjA1N2EwOTkxODQ1MzBiMWEyZmVmMTVjZWYzM2EyYzY= Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.45 WIB

[112]Cited from Bin Laden Considered Targeting Japanese Economy, National Review Online, available at https://media.nationalreview.com/post/?q=YjA1N2EwOTkxODQ1MzBiMWEyZmVmMTVjZWYzM2EyYzY= Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.45 WIB

[113]Cited from Why is the Sea of Japan Important?https://qanda.encyclopedia.com/question/why-sea-japan-important-91042.html Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.45 WIB

[114]Piracy is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 101) as follows: “Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew of the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(I) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft:

(II) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state:

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

© any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).” cited from https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm Accessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.45 WIB

[115]Cited from https://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/3/1/0/p253108_index.htmlAccessed on the 23rd of July, 2009 at 12.45 WIB

[116] Ibid,, p. 122

[117] Taken from a lecture slide, by Prof AA Banyu Perwita. For Strategic Studies Course.

[118] Vera Schwaz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Chinese Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Berkeley, C.A: University of California Press, 1990. p 78

[119] Cited from Jiang Ye. Will China be a “Threat” to its Neighbors and the World in the Twenty First Century?. Available at https://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol1/1-4jiang.pdf

[120] Ibid

[121] Cheong Sung Hwa, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea_ Japanese-South Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945-1952, Westport, Greenwood, 1991. p

[122] The Kurile Islands Dipute, on https://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/kurile.htm accesed on the 23rd of August, 2009

[123] Cited from Michael D Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future. Rand, 2000. p 198

[124] Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchurian and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. p 55

[125] Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. p 110

[126] Cited from Sayuri Ito, Does China’s Globalization and Structural Reform Pose a Threat to Japan? Available at https://www.nli-research.co.jp/english/economics/2003/eco030509.pdf accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[127] Ibid

[128] Cited from Cabinet Approves New National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Program. Available at https://www.fpcj.jp/old/e/mres/japanbrief/jb_62.html accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[129] Ibid

[130] Cited from Japan: New Government, new China Policy? Available at https://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Reports/The-Paradox-of-Sino-Japanese-Relations/Analysis/ accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

[131] Cited from Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, available at north+korea+threat+Japan+taro+aso&cd=1&hl=id&ct=clnk&gl=id accessed on the 24th of June, 2009 at 23.30 WIB

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